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

From left to right behind FDR: Cong. Dennis Chavez, Sen. Francis Case, Sen. Hugh Scott, Sen. Bronson Cutting, Sen. Sam G. Bratton. Courtesy *Albuquerque Journal.*

BRONSON CUTTING VS. DENNIS CHAVEZ: BATTLE OF THE PATRONES IN NEW MEXICO, 1934

WILLIAM H. PICKENS

FOR THE FIRST TIME in its history, New Mexico has a clean cut political issue, the welfare of the people on one side, and every selfish interest on the other." Bronson Murray Cutting paused and smoothed back the hair which had matted on his forehead in the sultry Albuquerque Armory. The crowd generously applauded and again the senior senator's voice filled the October night:

> The Democratic party in New Mexico has adopted a policy that was and is excoriated by the democratic president of the United States. That shows you the futility of the two party system. That shows you there are only two positions that an individual or a party can take. You are either for or against the laboring man, the farmer, the small citizens, the welfare of those who cannot take care of themselves.[1]

Since the year was 1934, the place Depression America, and those who could not help themselves probably a majority of U.S. citizens, Cutting's listeners understood and approved his words.

By November 2, with the long campaign near its end, Congressman Dennis Chavez, the opponent of Bronson Cutting, was likewise adamant:

> The legislation I shall sponsor and strive to get enacted, if I am elected to the U.S. Senate, shall be the legislation the majority of the citizens want sponsored and enacted. I shall never assume the attitude that I know what is best for the people, and that I am so much wiser than they are that my opinion is unquestionable and the only correct one. I shall never strive to be or pose as a political dictator in any sense of the word.[2]

These quotations indicate the contrast between Bronson Cutting and Dennis Chavez during one of the most crucial campaigns in New Mexico's history. The voters were forced to choose between the two most powerful public figures which the parties could offer. Since the early nineteen twenties, however, Cutting and Chavez had been strangers in virtually every trait of character and breeding except for their similar political aspirations. The succeeding decade was to twist their lives into strange shapes. In a drama reminiscent of Thornton Wilder's bridge at San Luis Rey these two men were to meet over the finest prize in New Mexico politics: a seat in the United States Senate.

It is strange that such a remarkable moment in our state's history has not generated more profound explanations. The several interpretations which have appeared tend toward uniformity. None of them explain both the larger aspects of the campaign and the compelling personalities of the candidates. I should like to raise a few questions in an attempt to clarify the data which scholars have gathered over the years.

First, what sort of man was Bronson Cutting: a consistent charlatan or a humane Progressive? Was he an astute opportunist who cunningly mobilized poor Spanish-speaking farmers, wealthy oilmen, and fraternal veterans, or did his patrician character bridge the gaps honestly and openly? Cutting's personality has been widely explored,[3] but his political philosophy has too often been left untouched by students of this era. Second, although Dennis Chavez in 1934 was hardly as complicated a man as Cutting, in a limited way, shaped by his ethnic background, he was just as eccentric. For instance, why did Chavez risk his political future in a clash with the invincible senior senator when he probably could have defeated interim Senator Carl Hatch in the primary and easily won a seat across the aisle from Cutting? Is the only answer, as postulated by several studies, that he desired to replace Cutting as New Mexico's *patrón*?[4] Finally, the New Deal must be mentioned. It was years after Bronson Cutting's death before reasonable speculation appeared concerning Roosevelt's reason for endorsing the more conservative Chavez who had supported John

Nance Garner for the Democratic nomination in 1932.[5] This article seeks to portray the drama of the collision between these two unique personalities, and to illuminate the larger outlines of the New Deal in New Mexico and ways that depression was shaping political consciousness. After sketching the political lives of Cutting and Chavez—1934 was merely the termination of a long process—I shall offer some tentative answers to the questions posed above.

I. *BRONSON CUTTING IN NEW MEXICO*

CUTTING was a transplant from high society on Long Island, a graduate of Groton and Harvard. Suffering from tuberculosis, he came to New Mexico on a stretcher in 1910. Here this flamboyant personality regained his health enough to become state secretary for Roosevelt's Bull Moosers two years later. Cutting's career for the next twenty years, during which he successively wore the label Progressive, Democrat, and Republican, mirrored his character: he was erratic, confident, aggressive, yet he always maintained a polished compassion which endeared him in ways similar to those of his Harvard classmate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Cutting was often unpredictable, except when aroused in the political arena. His many enemies could always testify to the awesome if unorthodox force he martialed against them. Had it not been for his great wealth and his ownership of the *Santa Fe New Mexican,* Cutting undoubtedly would have been ignored in serious political circles. The number of his biographers indicates that the man and his successes were singular, and that his career was even more vivid because his style was not indigenous to political New Mexico.[6]

For the beginnings of Cutting's political strength we must return to his quarrel with Democratic Governor Arthur T. Hannett in 1925. There was a long tradition in the state that public men needed some special focus for their attention between elections so that in even Novembers they could form coalitions representing a broad spectrum of accomplishments. As a concerned citizen, Bronson Cutting seized upon the idea of a labor commissioner and a

veterans' bureau as justifiable services of government. Hannett, who was determined to do a constructive if conservative job for New Mexico, dismissed the proposals as extravagant and aimed solely at mobilizing votes.[7] Hannett argued that the state was too poor for such projects and, indeed, the cost of all state and local services during the next fiscal year was a modest sixteen million dollars.[8]

Perhaps more crucial to the rejection of Cutting's proposals was the pervasive philosophy among officials that the primary responsibility of the social authority was the gentle guidance and protection of citizens, especially from one another. Government in agricultural New Mexico had always performed the tasks that were unprofitable or entirely unsuited to private enterprise, but needed for orderly administration. The forte of these politicans was rhetoric, not public action. Both parties firmly believed that fundamental changes should come from the private sector and only afterwards be seconded by governmental action. Organized labor was painfully weak in New Mexico, and conservative Republicans, along with many Democrats, did not feel that state government had the resources or the mandate to change that condition. They also insisted that veterans' affairs were Federal business and that parallel operations would be wasteful. This was, of course, exactly the pattern which was to develop in almost every agency during the New Deal.[9]

As a result of this rebuke, Bronson Cutting threw his financial support to Hannett's Republican opponent in 1926, and was rewarded by appointment to the vacant seat of the late Senator A. A. Jones in 1927. While critical questions about his reliability plagued party stalwarts back home, he hurried to Washington. Reports filtered back, however, that Cutting appeared orthodox:

> The administration forces did not know how to place him. Last week I [J. M. Hervey] made the acquaintance of several influential Republicans in the House and Senate and they all said that they were very much disappointed that you [Governor Richard Dillon] did not send a dependable Republican up here. . . .

> However, the first test came yesterday and he voted on two occasions with the straight Republican ticket.[10]

Cutting's political mentor, Governor Dillon, made the same points in the 1928 campaign: "Senator Cutting is safeguarding our tariff interests in the Senate. . . . He has fearlessly championed . . . the protective tariff, conservancy . . . [and] public land restored to state ownership."[11] The neophyte had clearly adopted the tenets of New Mexico Republicanism during its finest hours—or had he forgotten the expansion of government which he had advocated earlier?

THE REPUBLICANS were swept into office in the 1928 campaign, winning every statewide race by margins that threatened to wreck the political balance since statehood. Even the GOP leaders were stunned. The *Albuquerque Journal* wondered whether the Democrats were in permanent eclipse.[12] Burdened with Governor Al Smith of New York, a wet Catholic, as their candidate for President, the Democrats lost even their traditional support in the eastern, Baptist counties of New Mexico. From the statewide perspective the essential point was that the Republicans had forged the most powerful coalition in New Mexico's history, with Bronson Cutting, Charles Springer, and Richard Dillon each contributing a significant bloc of votes. Spanish-speaking farmers and their brothers in the barrios had voted solidly along with sheepmen and wealthy commercial interests for Republican prosperity. Even organized labor went GOP.[13] An analysis of the components of this grand coalition will indicate the possibilities which Bronson Cutting saw for permanent Republican strength.

Impoverished Spanish Americans[14] lived all along the Rio Grande and its tributaries. The tradition of dividing land among all surviving sons had splintered their agricultural production into miniscule units: in 1930 about 10,000 of the 31,404 farms had less than fifty acres and most were in central New Mexico.[15] "Accelerated soil erosion"[16] and lack of formal training in the tech-

niques of intensive cultivation guaranteed that they would remain subsistence farmers while at the same time, their relatives in the towns

> battle[d] their own cultural inadequacy. . . . They [had] no tradition of competition, of education, or of Western Civilization beyond the Sixteenth Century.[17]

These New Mexicans were analogous in some ways to the immigrants who had swarmed into America since the 1890's. They had deep cultural traditions which they wished to maintain—Spanish—but rejected their immediate heritage from Mexico. Their language was often considered inferior, perhaps because it did not well express Anglo-American values of commercialism and individualism. Their religion was stringent and sensuously pagan to many of their non-Catholic neighbors. These Spanish-speaking people were both "sensitive and proud,"[18] while many of them occupied a servant status and a makeshift, manipulated citizenship. Either overtly or subtly, these people were constantly accused of inferiority, and they reacted much the same as did new Americans in the industrial centers of the east who were likewise organized into massive political blocs. Clustering under the *patrón* for jobs and political advice, Spanish Americans in the Rio Grande Valley also looked for some protection against the strange, new Anglo ways which intruded on every side.[19]

There were differences, however, between the new wave of immigrants which swept onto America's eastern shores after 1890 and these Spanish-speaking New Mexicans. Unfortunately, the discrepancies made the latter less amenable to political change. First of all, they were hardly newcomers. Often their families extended far back into the colonial past, and most held some piece of land which had formerly been part of an extensive grant fragmented through equal inheritance, sale, or outright fraud. Secondly, until 1940 Spanish surnames were in the numerical majority in New Mexico. Slowly, and most painfully, they saw their domination dwindling away[20] and this kindled a fierce reactionary streak and

an insistence on biculturalism which was not as evident among eastern immigrants. A terrible paradox haunted these citizens: they revered a past and a heritage which had little relevance to the euphoria of the American Twenties or to the desperation of the Thirties. At the same time, they shared the dream of material abundance which permeated our nation during these years. In effect, these Spanish Americans were locked in a position neither in nor out of American society. Although they neither wished nor were compelled to abandon their indigenous heritage, they sought the new advantages which, rightly or wrongly, were incompatible with that heritage. They were segregated but unorganized. In order to secure their votes, both Dennis Chavez and Bronson Cutting had to find some kind of solution to this dilemma.

These frustrated Spanish Americans adored Bronson Cutting. Consistently, he employed their brothers, fought for their candidates, and conversed in their tongue.[21] Cutting first protected their interests in 1926 when he opposed Governor Hannett's election reforms which would have prohibited straight party tickets and assistance within the voting booth. Such provisions were common in other states, but Cutting argued that the high proportion of Spanish-speaking illiterates in New Mexico meant that they would be disfranchised by such a scheme. In spite of such moralistic hindsight as that of Warren Beck, who asserted that attacks on the Election Code were "bigoted, sordid, and irresponsible,"[22] there is much evidence that many New Mexicans would have been prevented from voting.[23] At any rate, this was the prevailing opinion, and villagers along the Rio Grande loved the handsome Anglo from Harvard who seemed honestly interested in protecting them not only from such diabolical desires as they believed Hannett harbored but also from the Spanish patrones who had exploited them for centuries. But more than this, as he traveled extensively in their midst, the wealthy Cutting became a symbol of affluent and comfortable America, while his aesthetic love of their heritage convinced them that such duality was not anachronistic. Further, Cutting's distaste for men of his own political standing (mostly shrewd Anglos) increased his fondness for the unaffected life of the leath-

er-faced farmer whose Hispanic hospitality and fiery fiestas charmed the patrician. Furthermore, these people took Bronson Cutting very seriously while many leaders of his own community laughed at everything except his money. For his own part, Cutting understood that Spanish Americans could love him more than a man from their own ethnic background since he combined the divergent motivations in their hearts. In addition, he did not compete with them: his political rise would not implicitly demean them as the ascendancy of a leader from their own ranks might. In 1934 Dennis Chavez was certain that his people would support their own, but he failed to reckon with these powerful undercurrents.

Another crucial segment of the voting population was the workers. Although only 4,476 persons were officially categorized as wage earners in 1929,[24] their families and the expanding towns promised to make them a potent new factor in the balance of power. Their impact was felt in the eastern counties, especially where oil had been discovered in 1924. By 1930 New Mexico had become one of the leading oil states,[25] and the oil fields were the most important reason for the six counties' climb from 12.4 per cent of the state's total vote in 1926 to 17 per cent in 1934.[26] It was also becoming apparent that the lower-middle-class mercantile interests which provided a foundation for the struggling towns had a common stake with many laborers, certainly with those who extracted natural resources. The Depression served to drive both groups closer together as Cutting's speeches in 1934 indicate.

These, then, were the political possibilities which absorbed the Senator from New Mexico. How Cutting protected and promoted the interests of these divergent groups has been neglected by historians—possibly because Cutting's erratic practice of politics is much more engaging. Likewise, most accounts only contain the violent reactions which he elicited: " '[Hannett's] political ruin was due to Bronson Cutting, a political Frankenstein who turned upon anyone he could not dominate, Republican or Democrat alike.' "[27] Such remarks have led even sympathetic biographers to emphasize unduly Cutting's irascibility, his inconsistency, or his

luck. It is time that these colorful reviews of his antics be restored to their proper perspective by due attention to the Senator's numerous attempts to weld together the two most substantial groups in political New Mexico.[28]

ONLY ONCE during the Twenties was Cutting able to convince his Republican allies that such a coalition should be established through legislative action. On January 23, 1929, the Speaker of the New Mexico House of Representatives and two other legislators introduced a strong proposal for a labor commissioner with the power "to require the performance of any act that is necessary for protection of life, health, and safety of employees."[29] The story of the ensuing explosion within the Republican Party has been well documented. In brief, the srtuggle became one between U.S. Senator Bronson Cutting who led the "governmental expansionists" and Charles Springer who controlled the "Old Guard." Springer distrusted any artificial coalition between Republicans and working men. Rumors of high-powered politics were rampant. Newspapers devoted most of their space to debates on the Bill and editorials on the debaters. In the heat of the controversy, the Republican Majority Leader in the Senate resigned, "stating as his reason that he could not vote for the Republican [platform] pledge of establishing a Labor Commission."[30] The legislature was deadlocked for six weeks and no agreement was reached on any major law until the fifty-eighth day of the sixty-day session. On March 8, the last day, the Labor Commissioner Bill came before the Senate for final consideration after the lower chamber had narrowly passed it. The drama of that particular debate was incredibly intense. Almost every political figure in the state was present, including Cutting who missed President-elect Hoover's inauguration for this moment. Defeat came for the Bill after hours of pounding applause, emotive speeches, jeers, and violence on the Senate floor, but no one really won. The bedraggled opponents of the proposed labor commission stood afterwards jabbering among themselves. Perhaps they realized that their own sun was setting. As Charles

Judah said, "the Republican Party in New Mexico was butchered by its own leaders."[31]

One of the most misunderstood parts of Cutting's career is his role in this fight. The usual explanation is that he merely sought control of the Republican Party and seized this as a likely issue. Andrea A. Parker's recent analysis continues this interpretation:

> Cutting decided upon the Labor Commissioner as the test of strength. . . . The formation of an office of State Labor Commissioner had been the excuse used by Cutting to break relations with the Republican Party.[32]

Such a view insists that the Old Guard cared little about the substance of the Bill since it was probably unenforceable, but that they wanted Cutting dispatched to Washington and his links to the legislative party severed. Adherents of this interpretation insist that the Depression caused further loss of faith in the GOP and that Roosevelt's largess cemented the poor of New Mexico into Democratic ranks. They also view Cutting's assistance to the Democrats as undermining every effort to reunite his adopted Republican Party. Such conclusions make several errors.

First, this group argues that success spoiled the 1928 Republicans so that they fell to criticizing one another rather than the Democrats. In addition to assuming that GOP leaders were a good deal less shrewd than they were, this perspective does not account for much legislative history in New Mexico. Republicans had exercised similar control before statehood but had not disagreed so violently. After 1912, they controlled the legislature twice, just as solidly as in 1929, yet such breaches had not occurred.[33] Defeat for the Labor Commissioner Bill stemmed from the fact that strong and bipartisan forces were always aligned against any new proposal which might tighten the finances of the state or cause reorganization of the system. Republicans were justifiably suspicious that their support of the laboring man might lose them the votes of wealthy New Mexicans.

The second error of proponents of the "Cutting schism" is their

insistence that neither side was truly concerned with the Labor Bill reforms, that it was merely a convenient issue for domination of the Party. They contend that the issue was political and not economic. This ignores the fact that several other controversial measures were presented to the legislature. Among these were additional free textbook legislation, an appropriations bill opposed by the powerful Taxpayers Association, a sweeping Workmen's Compensation Act, a new securities bill, a measure enlarging the State Highway Department's powers, and proposals for uniform banking laws.[34] Any or all of these issues were better adapted for victories over conservatives, if that had been the sole goal of Cutting progressives, since none of these proposals dealt with extensive institutional additions or seeming "class" legislation.

Bronson Cutting was dumbfounded by the consistent Republican vote of the poor Spanish-American counties. He realized that Republicans such as Charles Springer, Solomon Luna, Charles Spiess, and Thomas B. Catron had effectively adapted the economic patrón system to politics and that they believed peon loyalty to the interests of wealthy landowners both natural and eternal. Cutting insisted that conservatism could not continue to attract votes from the underprivileged majority in New Mexico and that increasing affluence would soon weaken their subservience.[35] He believed that only a solid coalition between Rio Grande agricultural counties and the growing vote of labor in the eastern oil fields could maintain Republicans in power. Other progressives contended that this political front led by Cutting's wealth and his power of the press would be invincible. To them, the Labor Commissioner Bill was the first step toward convincing Anglo workers of the political possibilities of cooperation with the Spanish-American lower class. How else can the solid Spanish-speaking vote in the legislature for this Bill—an Act which had little relevance to their agricultural constitutents—be explained?[36] All Republicans had welcomed the coalition which brought the stunning victory of 1928, but only the followers of Bronson Cutting were willing to abandon the old Republican fixtures in order to continue it.

II. *DENNIS CHAVEZ: UP FROM SO. ARNO*

WHEN Cutting first adopted this state, he lived in a different world from a thin young rodman who worked for the Albuquerque City Engineer. Dionicio Chavez had been born into one of the oldest families in New Mexico. His desperate father, like so many others who had found little gold in the Gilded Age, moved to the barrio of Barelas in 1895 when Dennis was seven. Forced to leave school after the seventh grade, young Dennis worked in a dingy grocery store on South Arno in Albuquerque.[37] While Cutting was purchasing newspapers and promoting splinter parties, Dennis Chavez was learning the backroom, tough-minded politics which were characteristic of men with few resources other than their wits. In succession, Chavez was defeated for county clerk, appointed state Game Warden, edited a Belen newspaper, and attended Georgetown Law School while serving as assistant to the Executive Clerk of the U.S. Senate. He struggled long hours to overcome the twin handicaps of a limited education and the barriers erected against any aspiring Spanish American, particularly those imposed by his own people. As a result, the contrast with Cutting was striking. Dennis Chavez was rather stern and suspicious in a way common to self-made men. He scratched in the cloakrooms for political opportunities, yet revered the formal rules of politics and government since these had provided his path to success. Political power as exercised by patrones such as E. A. Miera and Thomas B. Catron, who tallied alike the votes of their sheep and the dear departed with those of residents,[38] had impressed the young Chavez, and he frankly determined to emulate them, adapting his own style to more sophisticated times. With dreams and doubts, he rose carefully in politics during New Mexico's Twenties.

By the summer of 1930, New Mexicans had sensed the widening circles of America's economic disturbances. Based as it was on the exploitation of natural resources, the local economy had never been abundant but had been self-supporting and somewhat stable. The Republican defeat in November 1930 did not reflect outright panic but was brought about by the party's disunity and general

uneasiness about national prosperity. Aided by his influential brother, David, in northern counties, Dennis Chavez shared in the Democrats' good fortune. At a convention which marked the rising strength of Bernalillo County, Clyde Tingley switched the votes that gained Chavez a second-ballot nomination for New Mexico's lone seat in the House of Representatives. Such an honor was a debt which the party paid for long service. Chavez was known as a stalwart even in the midst of party faithfuls and was proud of his regularity:

> For twenty-two years I have faithfully and loyally supported all democratic nominees from the senators, congressmen, governors down to the county surveyors. At no time has the party found me wanting when it called. . . . I was always willing to do my utmost for the nominee.
>
> Will I get the nomination? I will if the democrats are desirous of getting an additional congressman; if faithfulness, loyalty, and service are to be rewarded.[39]

The campaign of Chavez against Republican Albert Simms was energetic, orthodox, and successful. He trotted out traditional Democratic criticisms of the tariff as " 'the instrument of the few rather than of the many,' "[40] and chastised Republicans for ignoring the needs of his fellow Hispanos. Because of his past support for organized labor and veterans' benefits, Chavez was able to add these groups to his ethnic voters and defeat Simms by 18,000 out of 117,813 votes cast.[41] The old Barons of politics who had run New Mexico since statehood had not exactly elected a man from their midst, but Dennis Chavez was one who followed their lead and was safe in their eyes.

In order to describe Chavez as a congressman, it is necessary to understand the system of political thought which produced him. As a territory, New Mexico had been strongly Republican because the national administration had been dominated by that party since the Civil War. A small group of wealthy aristocrats slowly emerged and carefully wielded the political power delegated to them by

the United States. Leaders such as Albert Bacon Fall, Charles Spiess, Holm Bursum, Nathan Jaffa, Miguel Otero, George Curry, and Harvey Fergusson were spread over the state, and although they often came into conflict, they held a high respect for one another. They had written the state's constitution. They strongly influenced every important public official in the Twenties. So firmly established that nothing could threaten their social position, the political Barons served in most respects as the upper class of New Mexico. In addition to picking candidates for office when they personally declined to serve, many of these men insisted on limited government in New Mexico which would reflect their interests in the community, both state and national.

Because New Mexico had very limited tax resources under such an arrangement, campaign issues were not particularly important for the first two decades after statehood. Much more decisive were the candidate's personality, the party organization, and especially the men who supported him. Politics required a kind of toughness characteristic of the mercantile world but mellowed by a sense of the need for compromise within the knot of professional politicians. True skill was shown (and victory insured) not on the speaker's platform, but rather behind hotel doors where the racial and financial cleavages in New Mexico were squarely confronted. The precarious political balance saw the two parties split evenly for the governorship from 1912 through 1930, while Democrats did well in Congressional races but consistently lost in their bids for the legislature.[42] Intense fear of internecine destruction hung over the parties and made it difficult for any man to establish himself as a potent political force in his own right.[43] Therefore, party loyalty such as that proclaimed by Dennis Chavez became a cardinal virtue.

All these forces made for superficial campaigns. "I am for the constitution in its entirety. I love it all." "The will of the people as a whole must be carried out."[44] These were characteristic remarks by Chavez during the campaign of 1930. Such statements indicated that he held the opinion of the Barons about public authority. Not only did the young congressman learn this from the patricians

under whom he had served as political apprentice, but he himself realized that any increase in the burden of government in New Mexico would crack the citizens financially and destroy any man politically. So, theory, tradition, and practicality merged nicely for Dennis Chavez as the Thirties opened. For him and most other politicians, state government served its constituents by protecting their property and employing about a thousand of those who had served in the successful campaign. Chavez naturally carried many of these views to the national capital. During the period of New Mexico's extreme political immaturity, neither the problems nor the stakes were great, and a timeless conflict of high-powered rhetoric and low-temperature bargaining prevailed. Dennis Chavez became a master at both.

It is clear from the extensive analysis in Edward Lahart's work on the tenure of Chavez as a congressman that practical values guided his decisions. Although simplistic about problems such as foreign affairs and the tariff, Chavez was knowledgeable and thorough in his duty to his people. He insured that the levels of relief for Rio Grande farmers would not be diminished.[45] He also insisted on larger benefits for New Mexico's many veterans, and announced strong opposition to a regressive Federal sales tax which would have crippled his underprivileged state.[46] Such services for the state's narrow interests were always expected of a freshman congressman, but Dennis Chavez displayed unmatched intensity. Such an attitude did little to enhance his stature in the House of Representatives, but his stunning victory over Jose Armijo in 1932 (94,764 to 52,905) even topped Roosevelt's huge majority in the state. During the next term, Chavez demonstrated the same zeal for New Mexico's interest with little concern for national problems. In addition after Senator Sam G. Bratton's resignation in May 1933 and the death of Democratic Governor Seligman in September, Chavez became more openly involved in state politics.[47] By November 1933 he had become the fourth New Mexican since statehood to serve on the powerful Democratic National Committee, which had influence over patronage.[48] By 1934, Dennis Chavez had risen to the top of the State Democratic Party, but prac-

tical and shrewd as ever, he realized that the enigmatic Bronson Cutting still held sway over the popular imagination. All the contributions from Federal coffers which Chavez could muster could not match the electrifying appeal of New Mexico's lone national hero, or so it seemed to many. After years of struggle and preparation on both sides, the dramatic battle of the patrones would shake politics in New Mexico as it has not been shaken since.

III. *THE MONUMENTAL CAMPAIGN, 1934*

CUTTING'S MANEUVERS for re-election began in 1932. Franklin Roosevelt was still clinging to conservative economics—"at Pittsburgh in October [1932] he condemned the Hoover administration for failing to balance the Federal budget, describing Hoover's spending as 'most reckless and extravagant.' "[49] Yet Bronson Cutting, already an advocate of enormous expansion of the Federal government, was urging deficit spending to meet the crisis. When Dennis Chavez argued for a twenty-five per cent cut in Federal expenses, Cutting countered that:

> The resources of this country are well nigh inexhaustible. There is no real danger to the maintenance of our public credit. What we do need is an immediate expansion of employment on a colossal scale by the Federal Government.[50]

At a time when the New Deal did not really have shape in FDR's thinking, Cutting was predicting that " 'public works will not solve unemployment but they will start things going by increasing buying power among the masses.' "[51] In the *Congressional Record* of the seventy-eighth Congress, Bronson Cutting favored public ownership of utilities and nationalization of banks.[52] Later, he cited the failure to nationalize the banks during the crisis of March 1933 as "President Roosevelt's great mistake."[53] Such economic heresy was compounded by the Senator's repudiation of every article in the traditional Republican faith: He was wet, strongly favored recog-

nition of Russia, and held the tariff in contempt.[54] As the Hundred Days began in 1933, with FDR urging cutbacks in Federal spending, Cutting risked their long friendship by opposing such tactics as the slash of veterans' benefits. In short, Senator Cutting, who had rarely been equivocal on any major issue, became convinced early in the Depression that the Federal government was the only instrument powerful enough to energize the economy and bring acclaim to men of progressive vision.

As 1934 dawned, it indeed appeared that Bronson Cutting would be the overwhelming choice for United States Senator. He had abandoned the official structure of the sinking Republican Party in 1932. By his support of maverick groups such as *El Club Político Independiente,* a vital front for bolting Republicans, he had profited from the Democratic victory.[55] For this, the Old Guard despised him more than ever. Holm Bursum, J. M. Hervey, Ed Safford, and Lem White—once leading names in the Republican Party—held a conference in the summer of 1934 with the exclusive purpose of crucifying Cutting.[56] The Simms family, upper class New Mexicans who had married into the Mark Hanna dynasty, likewise set out to stop this rabid Republican. Cutting only laughed.

Indeed, these attacks seemed to strengthen his popularity, because the Baron system of politics had lost its authority in the deepening economic crisis. Thirty per cent of New Mexicans were on relief.[57] Few of them listened any longer to the platitudes which had promised progress and prosperity during the halcyon Twenties. Middle-ranking Republicans scrambled to support the one man with a positive anti-depression program—the only one among them with a solid chance for victory. In an unusual flash of insight, the *New Mexico State Tribune* outlined the factors necessary for any Cutting-Republican reconciliation:

> Mr. Cutting . . . has always been too smart to be cornered. He holds a balance of power and knows how to use it. He is a master politician. . . . For years old line politicians sniffed at his political ability. After about the fourth defeat they began to reconsider. Mr. Cutting has the

> gift of calculating rashness. . . . The Republican Party will come to Cutting because it has decided that such is the way to win.
>
> Mr. Cutting is . . . the unregenerate rebel who appreciated the net returns of rebellion. Senator Cutting wins political combats because he combines high intelligence with measured courage. He knows when to threaten and when to retreat.[58]

The Republicans did come to Cutting, and on his terms. First, he insisted that the party take a more liberal stance than the straggling Democrats. One writer maintains that the 1934 GOP platform had by far the broadest understanding of social responsibilities, of welfare provisions, and of concerns voiced by workers.[59] This opinion is substantiated by the enthusiastic support given Cutting by labor unions, which had always supported Chavez in the past.[60] Fleta Springer in the *New Republic* dismissed Chavez as a reactionary and revealed the underground desire of conservatives to "get Cutting in 1934 and defeat Roosevelt in 1936."[61] Lower-income groups applauded Cutting's firm stand against the Democrats' state sales tax which Chavez had been forced to endorse. On the other end of the spectrum, Cutting shrewdly lured the president of the New Mexico Petroleum Association into his ranks.[62]

In short, the Senator had succeeded in establishing the coalition of Spanish Americans and dispossessed Anglos around the state's periphery. When the air cleared in New Mexico, this lone Republican was elected in 1934, the only man in his party to win statewide office until 1950.

IV. *OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE*

On the whole, the election was a disappointment to state Democrats. Like so many others, the campaign bogged down into threats and rebuttals, charges of disloyalty, and allegations that public officials had over-profited.[63] There was much traditional rhetoric tailored to the economic crisis, but Democrats expected that the same forces that swept them to victory in 1932 would do so again. This was not to be the case: Carl Hatch led the state ticket with an

unimpressive fifty-five per cent majority over a weak Republican opponent. Several other Democrats barely outdistanced their counterparts.[64]

There were reasons for such weakness. Although Roosevelt was popular, he was unable to campaign for anyone within the state. Certainly the New Deal programs were not as well coordinated nor as massive as they would be in 1936. Democratic Governors Seligman and Hockenhull had inspired no one, and their policies were warmed over from the Twenties. In my opinion, the chief source of Republican strength was Bronson Cutting's insight. Through his prowess, the state GOP had stolen many issues and much thunder from Democrats. As at Yorktown, the band played "The World Turned Upside Down."

> Speaking from the reportorial standpoint only [said the *Albuquerque Tribune*] we do not recall a New Mexico campaign more scrambled as to issues and causes than the current one. Just now we have the republican party running on a Roosevelt platform. The democratic party, though Rooseveltian, is attracting anti-Cutting republicans. The republican national committeeman denounced the republican ticket. . . . Devoted Cutting supporters are ignoring candidate Dillon for the Senate. Democrats here and there are espousing the cause of Senator Cutting.
>
> Only the election will unscramble this egg.[65]

The egg was certainly unscrambled in the Cutting-Chavez race, and it hatched the next generation's ideas about political strength in New Mexico.

An analysis of key counties, as set forth on the following page,[66] shows that Cutting's strategy was sound, even though he defeated Chavez by only 2,284 votes out of 152,172. It is essential to remember that Dennis Chavez was the strongest Democratic candidate in New Mexico's history and that his campaign was superb. Nevertheless, several trends should be noted. Chavez and the Democrats were increasingly taking the Spanish-speaking vote away away from Republicans even when a candidate with a Spanish surname ran against Chavez in 1932. Cutting completely re-

EIGHT NEW MEXICO COUNTIES WITH OVER 70% SPANISH-SPEAKING POPULATION

	1930		1932		1934	
County	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
Mora	1879	2066	1527	2873	2209	2330
Rio Arriba	3032	3552	2032	5148	4042	4449
Taos	1830	2618	2981	3183	3233	3774
Guadalupe	1223	1790	1616	1839	1986	1643
Sandoval	1302	1424	1541	1837	2087	1768
Valencia	2751	2067	3151	2344	3224	2142
San Miguel	4808	3809	5767	4610	6852	4006
Socorro	1693	1916	1890	2539	3046	2479
TOTALS	18,518	19,242	20,505	24,328	26,679	21,591

THREE NEW MEXICO COUNTIES WITH MOST MINING LABOR VOTE

	1930		1932		1934	
County	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
Santa Fe	3974	3607	3636	5710	5040	4988
Colfax	2910	3330	3120	4367	3796	3575
McKinley	1683	1576	1237	2202	1782	1744
TOTALS	8567	8513	7933	12,279	10,618	10,307

SIX COUNTIES ON THE EAST SIDE WHICH WERE TRADITIONALLY DEMOCRATIC

	1930		1932		1934	
County	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
Eddy	637	1836	715	3593	1233	2658
Chaves	1782	2641	1581	4402	2618	2866
Roosevelt	334	1433	446	2831	971	1919
Curry	691	2141	768	3661	1632	3139
Quay	994	1931	806	2911	2028	2027
Lea	227	1186	245	2317	694	1652
TOTALS	4665	11,168	4651	19,715	9176	14,261

BERNALILLO COUNTY

	1930		1932		1934	
	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
	5947	8317	5875	12,203	9182	9454

versed that trend. It is also clear that labor votes in the mining districts had been solidly Democratic in 1932. There Cutting was able to force a draw: Only the large vote on the east side saved Chavez from worse defeat, and even then Senator Cutting attracted five thousand votes more than the 1932 Republican total. The crucial Bernalillo county vote which had gone overwhelmingly for Chavez as congressman was likewise split in 1934 as mercantile interests and Spanish Americans were torn between Roosevelt's New Deal and Cutting's philosophy.

Bronson Cutting had electrified the Republican Party in New Mexico. Speculation that Cutting would be the Republican nominee to oppose the giant Roosevelt in 1936 immediately intensified.[67] He was absolute dictator of his disheveled party in the state and was clearly the only man with vision enough to challenge the New Deal there. Bronson Murray Cutting, however, had enjoyed his last victory. Six months later he died in a foggy field near Kirkland, Missouri, in an eerie plane disaster.[68] With him the new Republican Coalition in New Mexico passed. The 1936 election crushed whatever life Cutting had breathed into his adopted party. No state Democrat won by less than 20,000 votes. Cutting's "Forgotten New Mexican" had voted Democratic, and it would be a long, long time before he changed.

V. *CONCLUSIONS*

FIRST, to determine whether Bronson Cutting was a charlatan, we must put aside his personal idiosyncrasies and concentrate on his political philosophy and his view of government's proper functions. Regardless of party label, Cutting had insisted since the nineteen twenties that public authority should be an active participant in the processes of social change. Government had to have powers to strike directly at evils produced by an industrial society. In many of these attitudes he was similar to progressives of earlier periods, but Cutting had no illusions about return to a simpler America, or the effectiveness of negative public action such as trust busting.

Rather, he advocated positive programs of welfare to aid the underprivileged and to give them weapons to fight for a larger share of the American Dream against guardians of the more ample portion. Only a strong paternalistic government with a thrust for economic equality could achieve these ends. Cutting's friends were bound to him by personal loans and favors, and he could understand the powerful appeal of men who offered a system of direct aid to destitute New Mexicans. He further understood that government services were coming to mean much more to the people than either free enterprise rhetoric or minimal patronage by state or Federal governments.

Obviously such a philosophy appealed more and more during the Great Depression. Cutting was in tune with the times. As a spokesman for massive government he was recognized in a way that Bob LaFollette, George Norris, and Hiram Johnson never were.[69] In addition, the Senator from New Mexico demonstrated, admittedly on a small scale, that rural and urban interests could be welded together into an electoral bloc based on a single philosophy of government, an achievement rarely realized by progressives in the past.

Secondly, we must confront the question, why did Dennis Chavez challenge the only man in New Mexico who could possibly have defeated him? The traditional answer maintains that Chavez was jealous of Cutting's leadership among Spanish-speaking New Mexicans. It is difficult to swallow this assertion for several reasons. Chavez could have assaulted Cutting's hold over the Rio Grande counties just as effectively if he had been elected as the senior Senator's counterpart. Defeat of incumbent Senator Carl Hatch in the primary could have done that for Chavez. Bronson Cutting was at the height of his popularity, especially in the counties which Chavez had to win, and the Congressman, with his sensitive system of political feelers, surely realized this. Dennis Chavez won elections because he was a superb tactician and a careful organizer. He was, after all, a patient and persistent man; after the election he doggedly pursued Cutting's seat all the way to the Senate Elections Committee.[70] Such a man would not have been

blinded by ethnic jealousy to the extent of unneccessarily risking his entire political future.

Recently it has been said that Chavez and his fellow Democrats underestimated Cutting's strength in the aura of the New Deal. This supposition has merit but needs amplification. No Democrat in New Mexico (with the possible exception of Albuquerque's Clyde Tingley) accurately perceived the political changes which began around 1930. Certainly men like Chavez understood that their party was strengthened by the fact that Republicans had been caught in the maelstrom, but the only conclusion to be drawn from studies of their thinking in 1934 is that they did not realize the direction the political current was taking. Chavez had little conception of Cutting's coalition strategy. He analyzed the situation in terms of the old Baron rules for victory. Had he not gone far enough when he sought out popular issues and balanced political forces?[71] Had he not placed his supporters in key positions with control over patronage? Had he not carefully measured out phrases perfected through long years of political practice? Everything in the past of Dennis Chavez pointed to victory. Moreover, he continued to believe the national administration could defeat any Republican.

But this time Chavez' instincts failed. Political influence no longer rested exclusively upon patronage in the traditional sense but also upon the all-embracing system of relief and work projects which Cutting supported. Individual favors from Congressman Chavez could not compare to the lightning collective action in time of severe need by the massive government which Cutting proposed. The New Deal and Cutting were partners in a sense. The crucial difference was that Roosevelt experimented his way into larger efforts[72] while Cutting had always been for big government to meet big challenges.

Finally, President Roosevelt's endorsement of Congressman Chavez must be explained, especially in the light of FDR's support for several pro-administration progressives who challenged Democrats. Again, several theories have been advanced. The first is that the President became angry over Cutting's insistence on increased

veterans' benefits. Other, more recent, ones include Roosevelt's resentment at an intemperate remark Cutting made about his polio, and the administration's constant disapproval of third party politics.[73]

There were other avenues, however, which might have led FDR down the way to Dennis Chavez. The Congressman was not really a conservative. His voting record indicates substantial support for the New Deal. Chavez was certainly impressed by Roosevelt's ebullient courage and the enormous presidential power. Furthermore, Chavez had no real philosophy of government; he was a man who liked popular projects. Time after time he stressed that he would back what the people wanted. Beginning in 1933, public opinion clearly favored the New Deal, and the pragmatic Congressman was certain to endorse any legislation with direct benefits to his constituents. In that respect, the President could count on him.

Another aspect of this twisted game undoubtedly plagued Roosevelt. As a candidate in 1932, he had run a successful campaign by recalling the "Forgotten Man," the American in the middle and lower classes who had been left behind by the organizational power of industry and who was the real victim of the crunch of depression. FDR forged a coalition with such an appeal that it reversed many political patterns established since the Civil War. Not only was Bronson Cutting struggling for the votes of the "Forgotten New Mexicans," but in many instances his insights were clearer than the President's. Cutting, indeed, had proved that he could unify agrarian and urban progressivism in ways that other national figures could not. Invariably, if they remained in the Republican Party or went independent, progressives won in the 1930's only when they faced extreme or outrageous opponents.[74] Progressives were independent by nature and usually disorganized. Cutting proved that he could overcome these drawbacks and make a much broader appeal than either the Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson brands of progressivism. This controversy was still raging during the New Deal. Cutting's insistence on a bold, new government in favor of the farmer, the worker, and dispossessed

minorities frightened many of these liberals, but in time this became their political standard.

CUTTING'S POLITICAL FORESIGHT and his personality made him increasingly invincible. He had always reflected confidence and control. He had always been noble yet merciless. Like Roosevelt, Bronson Cutting appeared courageously tough when facing the powerful financial interests, but favorable media loved to portray his tenderness with the helpless—in New Mexico, with brown farmers. Yet the public perceived no erratic experimenter in Cutting. Rather they saw a man of consistent vision who had finally come into his own.

Richard Hofstadter maintains that "the Progressive mind was hardly more prepared than the conservative mind for what came in 1929."[75] Bronson Cutting is the exception. Perhaps the Senator did not perceive the dangers which his big-government philosophy harbored because he felt so strongly that it was the only answer to depression and political instability. Such a combination of personal traits and rugged insistence on paternalist ideology made Bronson Cutting a national figure to be reckoned with during these darkest days. Moreover, the hard-headed national leaders of the Republican Party saw the advantage of diverting into their own coffers the wealth of the "chief financial supporter of the nation's progressives."[76] Superb politician that he was, Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized the danger, even from as unlikely a place as New Mexico.

NOTES

1. *Albuquerque Journal,* October 10, 1934.
2. *Albuquerque Tribune,* November 2, 1934.
3. National news magazines were fascinated by Senator Cutting's personality. The best examples are: Jan Spiess, "Feudalism and Senator Cutting," *American Mercury,* vol. 33 (1934), pp. 371-74; O. P. White, "Cutting Free," *Colliers,* vol. 94 (October 27, 1934), pp. 24 *et passim,* and "Membership in Both Clubs," *American Mercury,* vol. 25 (1932), pp. 182-89.
4. Richard Beaupre, "The 1934 Senatorial Election in New Mexico" (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1969), pp. 19, 93. Jonathan R. Cunningham, "Bronson Cutting" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1940), pp. 191-92. Ernest B. Fincher, "The Spanish Americans as a Political Factor in New Mexico" (unpublished dissertation, New York University, 1950), p. 151.
5. "But there was much sentiment for John Garner, our neighbor from Texas, who appealed to the conservative, southern-oriented old timers in the party. Governor Clyde Tingley and Hannett as well as Chavez, were for Garner." Clinton P. Anderson and Milton Viorst, *Outsider in the Senate* (New York, 1970), p. 27. See also Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes,* vol. 1 (New York, 1953), p. 217. For a sound critique of this particular campaign, see Beaupre.
6. Almost every work on New Mexico politics has an extensive account of Bronson Cutting. The leading analyses which deal exclusively with him are: Patricia Cadigan Armstrong, *A Portrait of Bronson Cutting Through His Papers,* Department of Government *Bulletin,* no. 57 (Albuquerque, 1959); Beaupre; Cunningham; Charles Judah, *The Republican Party in New Mexico,* Department of Goverment *Bulletin,* no. 20 (Albuquerque, 1949); Francis McGarity, "Bronson Cutting, Senator from New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1934); Andrea A. Parker, "Arthur Seligman and Bronson Cutting: Coalition Government in New Mexico, 1930-1933" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1969); Gustav Seligmann, "The Political Career of Bronson Cutting" (unpublished dissertation, University of Arizona, 1967).
7. Arthur Thomas Hannett, *Sagebrush Lawyer* (New York, 1964), p. 156. Robert G. Thompson, "The Administration of Governor Arthur T. Hannett" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1949). Full analysis of the Hannett-Cutting fight also appears in Charles B. Judah, *Governor Richard C. Dillon: A Study in New Mexico Politics,* Department

of Government *Bulletin,* no. 19 (Albuquerque, 1948), pp. 13-15. Armstrong has an excellent primary account on pp. 37-38.

8. New Mexico Taxpayer's Association, *The New Mexico Tax Bulletin,* vol. 6, no. 3 (June 1927), p. 1. For these years, these *Bulletins* provide the most detailed information on New Mexico's economy and conservative attitudes concerning her government.

9. Jack Holmes, *Politics in New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1967), p. 200. "In essence, two entities of government operated [during the New Deal] in every area of the state. The traditional offices of state government operated as before. . . . At the same time, an overlapping pattern of federal work relief and related agencies based on local and state units or areas of government grew rapidly. Legally and financially distinct though the state and federal agencies were, they were also, politically and operationally, so closely related that they were directed and staffed from the same source [the Democratic Party]."

10. This is personal correspondence from J. M. Hervey to Governor Dillon written on Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections stationery, January 17, 1928. Richard C. Dillon Collection of Papers, University of New Mexico.

11. Address of Richard Dillon at Willard, New Mexico, on October 15, 1928. Dillon Collection.

12. *Albuquerque Journal,* November 10, 1928.

13. In spite of Governor Dillon's brash use of the National Guard to prevent the Colorado Coal Strike (1927) from spilling into New Mexico, the two counties with the most miners supported Dillon by 53.3% of their vote whereas in 1926 they had narrowly gone for Democrat Hannett. See Dwight Ramsay, "A Statistical Survey of the Voting Behavior in New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1952), pp. 124, 126, 130, and 132; and Charles Bayard, "The Southern Colorado Coal Strike of 1927-8 and New Mexico's Preventative Measures" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1949).

14. The term "Spanish Americans" which was widely used by the news media during the New Deal era is justifiably out of favor with many chicanos at this time. The problem of reference to Spanish-speaking New Mexicans has caused me much worry, but I have decided to use the term "Spanish Americans," which was in vogue during the Thirties, in order to avoid anachronism.

15. *New Mexico Tax Bulletin,* vol. 10, no. 4 (July-August 1931), pp. 95-96.

16. Paul Beckett, *The Soil Conservation Problem in New Mexico,* Department of Government *Bulletin,* no. 2 (Albuquerque, 1946), p. 2.

17. George I. Sanchez, *Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1940), p. 13.

18. Hugh Woodward, "Needed Constitutional Changes in New Mexico," *New Mexico Business Review,* vol. 4 (January 1935), p. 70.

19. For the social and political integration of Spanish Americans during this era, the best studies (in addition to Fincher and Sanchez) are: Ruth Barker, "Where Americans Are Anglos," *North American Review,* vol. 228 (1929), pp. 568-73; Alfred Cordova, "Octaviano Ambrosio Larrazolo, the Prophet of Transition in New Mexico: An Analysis of His Political Life" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1950); Leo Grebler, "Mexican Immigration to the United States: the Record and its Implications," *Mexican American Study Project* (Division of Research, UCLA Graduate School, 1966); John T. Russell, "New Mexico: A Problem of Parochialism in Transition," *American Political Science Review,* vol. 30 (1936), pp. 285-87, and "State Regionalism in New Mexico" (unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, 1938); Paul Walter, "A Study of Isolation and Social Change in Three Spanish Speaking Villages in New Mexico" (unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, 1938).

20. For instance, in 1915 there had been twenty-two Spanish periodicals with a circulation of 15,000. By 1929, the number was down to ten. By 1938, the end of the New Deal in New Mexico, there were only four with 5,000 readers. Fincher, p. 280.

21. Armstrong, p. 39; Cunningham, p. 220; Holmes, p. 166; Spiess, p. 373.

22. Warren Beck, *New Mexico: A History of Four Centuries* (Norman, 1962), p. 309.

23. In 1920, 15.6% of all New Mexicans over ten years of age were illiterate, which was 2½ times the national average. By 1930, the New Mexico rate had lowered to 13.3%, but only Louisiana and South Carolina had higher illiteracy rates. It is also important to note that in 1930, ten of the twelve least literate counties were highest in Spanish American population. J. E. Seyfried, "Illiteracy Trends in New Mexico," University of New Mexico *Bulletin,* vol. 8, no. 8 (March 15, 1934), pp. 31, 34-36.

24. James Swayne, "A Survey of the Economic, Political, and Legal Aspects of the Labor Problem in New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1936), p. 8.

25. *New Mexico Tax Bulletin,* vol. 10, no. 3 (May-June 1931), p. 66.

26. Jennie Fortune, Secretary of State, *The New Mexico Blue Book* (Santa Fe, 1926). Secretary of State, *New Mexico Elections, 1911-1966* (Santa Fe, 1966).

27. Thompson, "Hannett," p. 133. This is a quotation from a personal

interview with Hugh Woodward, Lieutenant Governor under Richard Dillon, June 20, 1949.

28. One incident which has consumed many pages was the time Cutting in a rage induced by alcohol sent a henchman to deliver his resignation as Senator to Governor Dillon. The next few days were consumed by Cutting's valiant efforts to get the letter back. Vorley Rexroad, "The Two Administrations of Governor Richard C. Dillon" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1947), pp. 125-28.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

31. Judah, *Dillon,* p. 28.

32. Parker, pp. 9, 29. The same points are made in a variety of ways in Beck, pp. 310-11; Judah, *Dillon,* p. 34; Rexroad, p. 114. The impression undoubtedly comes from the tone of contemporary newspaper coverage: "The anti-Cutting group, whose members declared Friday night that this was not a labor bill fight, but was a fight to determine whether U.S. Senator-elect Bronson Cutting was to dominate the Republican Party. . . ." *Albuquerque Journal,* March 9, 1929.

33. For example, the First Legislature of New Mexico had sixteen Republicans, seven Democrats, and one Progressive-Republican in the Senate and twenty-eight Republicans against sixteen Democrats in the House. *New Mexico Blue Book, 1913* (Santa Fe, 1913), pp. 99-101.

34. Rexroad, p. 124.

35. Of all the accounts, only Charles Judah in *The Republican Party in New Mexico* (p. 10) brings up this point. Judah, however, does not pursue it into the Labor Commissioner fight or the 1934 election.

36. The only Spanish American in the Senate to vote against the Bill was M. A. Gonzales, a staunch enemy of Bronson Cutting. All the others were elected from non-labor counties and voted with Cutting's Progressives: Adam Gallegos from San Miguel; E. M. Lucero from San Miguel and Mora; A. C. Pacheco from Taos; E. D. Salazar from Rio Arriba and Sandoval.

37. Edward Lahart, "The Career of Dennis Chavez as a Member of Congress" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1958), pp. 2-8.

38. An authority on such *patrones* and their methods puts it mildly: "the absence of qualified voters at the polls is less a cause of concern than the presence of non-eligibles." Thomas C. Donnelly, *Rocky Mountain Politics* (Albuquerque, 1940), p. 230.

39. *Albuquerque Journal,* Evening Edition, August 16, 1930.

40. Lahart, p. 39.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

42. Ramsay, pp. 5-6.

43. A good example of a casualty of this system was O. A. Larrazolo, Governor from 1919 to 1921. He achieved national prominence through wise development of western lands programs, his assistance to public education, and the state's "Red" chasing during the Coal Strike of 1919, but Larrazolo was unable to gain support for renomination from older Republicans. Instead, he watched the prize go to a half-willing Judge from Socorro named Merritt Mechem. Cordova, pp. 89, 91.

44. *Albuquerque Journal,* Evening Edition, August 16, 1930.

45. Lahart, p. 57.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 87-88.

48. The others were Senator A. A. Jones, Arthur Seligman, and R. H. Hanna. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

49. David A. Shannon, *Between the Wars: America, 1919-41* (Boston, 1965), p. 144.

50. Quotation of Cutting in H. J. Hagerman, "Ducking and Cutting—an Uncensored Review," *New Mexico Tax Bulletin,* vol. 11, no. 9 (November 1932), p. 212.

51. *New Mexico State Tribune,* December 7, 1932.

52. Cunningham, p. 213.

53. Cutting, "Is Private Banking Doomed?" *Liberty,* March 31, 1934. Quotation is in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston, 1958), p. 5.

54. White, "Both Clubs," p. 189.

55. Parker, p. 22.

56. Holmes, pp. 172-73.

57. Thomas Donnelly, *The Government of New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1953), p. 148.

58. *New Mexico State Tribune,* Editorial, February 3, 1934.

59. Swayne, p. 58.

60. The New Mexico State Federation of Labor supported Cutting, but the powerful Albuquerque Central Labor Union did not. Cutting received the endorsement of William Green, President of the A.F. of L. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30, and E. E. Maes, "The Labor Movement in New Mexico," *New Mexico Business Review,* vol. 4 (1935), p. 139.

61. Fleta Springer, "Through the Looking Glass," *New Republic,* vol. 80 (November 7, 1934), p. 358.

62. The list of organizations and public officials which endorsed Bronson Cutting is enormous. See Lahart, pp. 109-12, and Beaupre, pp. 40, 46.

63. The *Albuquerque Journal* on October 22 charged that twenty-two relatives of Dennis Chavez were on the Federal payroll. John Miles said that Cutting had aided Communists financially and that he had corrupted the State American Legion. Lahart, p. 114. Ruth Hanna Simms compared Cutting to Hitler and Mussolini in the *Albuquerque Tribune* on November 5, 1934.

64. The Democrats for Congress, Governor, and Secretary of State won by only 6,000 votes, or by 52%.

65. *Albuquerque Tribune,* Editorial, October 2, 1934.

66. See tables. Secretary of State, *Elections,* unpaged.

67. Diogenes, "The New Mexico Campaign, A Struggle Between Two 'Outlander Baronies,'" *Literary Digest,* vol. 118 (November 3, 1934), p. 13.

68. Beaupre, p. 87. Whispered rumors persist to this day that the crash was no "accident." Yet Gustav Seligmann, after months of research, uncovered no concrete evidence of foul play.

69. For instance, just before his death Bronson Cutting had decided to sponsor a large program of Federal aid to education. "In all the welter of new deal issues, no legislative action had been taken to meet the depression's effects on public school education," said a contemporary. "The odds were against [Cutting]. . . . Public School teachers were a politically inarticulate and ineffective group." R. W. Hogue, "Senator Cutting's Last Fight," *New Republic,* vol. 88 (May 29, 1935), p. 77.

70. Richard Beaupre concludes his work with a full account of the determined fight Chavez was waging against Bronson Cutting's victory. See also U.S. Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections. *Report on the Chavez Election Contest.* Report no. 793, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., B9884, 1935.

71. In 1930 Chavez had supported the oil tariff when speaking in Roswell, but after travelling northward, condemned tariffs in general as benefiting only special interests. Lahart, p. 38. In 1932 he had insisted that the Federal Government had to cut expenditures but later voted consistently for emergency appropriations which greatly expanded the budget. *Ibid.,* pp. 73-74.

72. "'This country needs, and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation,' [FDR] told a graduating class at Oglethorpe University." James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York, 1956), p. 133.

73. Beaupre, pp. 89-92.

74. George W. Norris of Nebraska, for example, ran as an Independent for a fifth term in the U.S. Senate in 1936 against candidates from both parties. Terry Carpenter, the Democrat, was a radical who supported

the Townsendites and Long's "Share the Wealth" plans. He received half the number of votes that Norris did and trailed even the Republican. Two years earlier the LaFollette brothers had won statewide races as Progressives in Wisconsin but had been opposed by conservative Democrats.

75. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR* (New York, 1955), p. 306.

76. Donald R. McCoy, *Angry Voices: Left of Center Politics in the New Deal Era* (Lawrence, 1958), p. 203, n. 18.

RAYADO: PIONEER SETTLEMENT IN NORTHEASTERN NEW MEXICO, 1848-1857

LAWRENCE R. MURPHY

THE ESTABLISHMENT of a permanent settlement at Rayado on the edge of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in what is now Colfax County, New Mexico, marked a significant step in the American occupation of the Southwest. Spanish soldiers who explored the region in the early 1700's talked for a time of establishing a presidio at La Jicarilla, near the present village of Cimarron.[1] These plans were quickly abandoned, and for a century the area remained in the sole possession of the Ute, Apache, and Comanche. Later, Santa Fe bound caravans frequently crossed through the region, but no one wished to stay. In 1841, New Mexico Governor Manuel Armijo granted a huge tract of land in the area to Carlos Beaubien and Guadalupe Miranda. Their efforts to begin farming along the Vermejo, Ponil, Cimarron, and Cimarroncito creeks met with little success.[2] When United States troops marched toward Santa Fe in 1846, only a few small herds of cattle watched over by Mexican herders grazed the rich grass of northeastern New Mexico.[3]

Beaubien, who had assumed full control over the grant when his partner fled to Mexico with Armijo, persisted in his plans to develop the property. Originally he hoped that his son Narciso and Charles Bent would supervise the settlement, but their deaths in the Taos uprising forced a change of plans. He then turned to thirty-year-old Lucien B. Maxwell, whose name would become more indelibly associated with the area than his own. Maxwell spent his early life in Illinois and Missouri, where he was raised by his grandfather and two aunts. He joined John C. Fremont's first western expedition, as a hunter, met Kit Carson, and became his

friend. An uncle, Ceran St. Vrain, evidently took him to Taos, where he was introduced to Beaubien and his eldest daughter Luz, whom he married in June 1844. Subsequently, Maxwell worked for his father-in-law, delivering messages and transporting goods from Bent's Fort to Taos.[4]

Early in 1848 Beaubien decided to try once more to establish a lasting foothold on the eastern side of the Sangre de Cristos. He selected the fertile, well-watered valley of Rayado Creek, near the southern edge of his land grant and not far from the spot where the Taos Trail left the main Santa Fe road. Few documents from the period have survived, and many of them are contradictory, but a survey of the available materials indicates the following probable sequence of events.

Calvin Jones, a long-time employee at Rayado, testified many years later that Maxwell left Taos in February 1848. A small band of men including Tim Goodale, Manuel LeFavre, and a carpenter named James White accompanied him. A pack train of mules carried their supplies.[5] Why they set out in mid-winter is difficult to understand. It may have been that Maxwell wished to sell mounts and supplies to William Gilpin, who was camped on the Mora that winter.[6] Whatever their reasons, the venture proved disastrous, for a snow storm caught the men in the mountains, delaying them for several days and resulting in the loss of one mule. Eventually they struggled onto the plains and selected the location for their new settlement. No sooner had temporary log quarters been erected than most of the men began felling timber and sawing it into boards for more permanent buildings. By spring, when Jones arrived with a herd of cattle from Bent's Fort, enough lumber was on hand for three or four rooms.[7]

Not everything needed to start a frontier settlement could be had locally, so at the first hint of spring Maxwell left for Kansas with some of the men to buy supplies. Perhaps they also hoped to return some of the horses furnished Gilpin.[8] Quickly completing business affairs in the east, the Rayado manager left Council Grove late in May with Santa Fe merchant Preston Beck, mountaineer

Tom Boggs, and others.[9] The group made a short stop at Bent's Fort before they headed south into New Mexico. On June 12, while the party was in the Raton Mountains, a band of Jicarilla Apache attacked Maxwell's pack train, driving off thirty mules and fifty horses; the loss, including six hundred deerskins, amounted to $7,200.[10]

Although the loss of these supplies was serious, the worst of Maxwell's difficulties had yet to occur. Regrouping along the Greenhorn and later at Bent's Fort, they decided to cross the mountains through Manco Burro Pass near the present New Mexico-Colorado boundary. Three days later they had camped for the night and were eating dinner when a large body of Indians, apparently Ute, surrounded their camp and began firing. Several men, including Maxwell, received serious wounds. Most eventually escaped into the woods and slowly made their way back to Taos. Two were so badly wounded they could not move and had to be left to the "mercy of the Indians." A third man who fell back during the trek almost met the same fate, but he finally recovered. The Indians also captured two children, who were ransomed after three months in captivity.[11]

Besides demonstrating how perilous life on the New Mexico frontier could be, the Manco Burro tragedy seriously jeopardized the existence of Rayado. Maxwell, whose leadership was vital to the settlement's success, had a bullet lodged deep in his neck. He rushed to the nearest physician in Santa Fe, where the ball was cut out in an "extremely difficult and painful" operation.[12] Not for many months would he recover sufficiently to take an active role at Rayado. Moreover, supplies from the east could not be obtained for another year; money to buy goods and employ laborers had been considerably reduced by the loss of the first train. Maxwell was so poor by this time that, according to one somewhat suspect source, he had to borrow $1,000 from his friend Carson to meet expenses.[13] Despite all these difficulties, Maxwell was able to sell enough hay to the army and supplies to travelers on the Santa Fe Trail to assure the continuation of the Rayado project. In January 1849

John C. Fremont wrote his wife from Taos that Maxwell was "at his father-in-law's doing a very prosperous business as a merchant and contractor for the troops."[14]

Meanwhile in Taos, Carson had been debating his future plans. On one hand Fremont suggested that he accompany him to California and eventually settle there. But Kit was reluctant, as Fremont put it, to "break off from Maxwell and family connections."[15] During the early spring he decided to decline Fremont's offer and stay in New Mexico. "In April," Carson recorded in his autobiography,

> Maxwell and I concluded to make a settlement on the Rayado. We had been leading a roving life long enough and now was the time, if ever, to make a home for ourselves and children. We were getting old and could not expect to remain any length of time able to gain a livelihood as we had been for such a number of years.

At Maxwell's settlement Carson immediately began "building and making improvements." Soon, he recalled, we "were in a way of becoming prosperous."[16]

Actually Carson was only the most famous of many New Mexicans who moved across the mountains in 1849. Most were Spanish-Americans, but there were a few Indian slaves (mostly Navajo) and some Anglo-Americans. By summer, forty or fifty men were busy pulling in timber from the nearby mountains and whipsawing it into lumber. Others were occupied mowing the tall grass sold to the government as fodder. Increasing numbers of sheep, horses, mules, and cattle grazed on the surrounding pastures and meadows. Four farmers arrived that second spring to begin tilling the virgin soil and building ditches to carry water into their fields. Fifteen more families joined them the next season. Rather than sell land, Beaubien and Maxwell apparently arranged a system of shares whereby they and the farmers split whatever was produced.[17]

The first description of Maxwell's settlement came when Charles E. Pancoast, a Pennsylvanian headed for the California goldfields, visited "Riadjo" in July 1849. Like many other Amer-

icans, Pancoast was so overwhelmed by Carson that his whole report centered on the "famous mountaineer." He reported that the ranch was not at all "stylish." The central structure was a two-storied log cabin; several smaller adobe huts adjoined it. High walls surrounding the entire complex protected it from Indian attack. Other adobe buildings outside the compound served as corrals, stables, and slaughter houses. A "dozen or more Americans and Mexicans" in addition to twenty Indian men and some squaws lived at the settlement.

At first Carson had little to say to his visitors, but as the evening wore on and the glow of the campfire deepened, he began to tell stories of his long career and more recent difficulties in protecting the Rayado settlement from the Ute and Apache. Sometimes it was necessary to summon the army, but Kit led his listeners to believe that he had "pursued them so severely that they found it their best policy to make their peace with him." Visiting Indians were always treated kindly and given food. Yet even Carson was not wholly convinced of the natives' friendliness, for he still guarded the livestock day and night. Pancoast and the others were so enthralled with Carson's stories and the battle wounds he displayed that it was eleven o'clock before they all retired for the night.[18]

If Carson honestly believed that the Indians along New Mexico's northeastern frontier could be so easily pacified, his optimism did not last long. In October 1849, only three months after Pancoast's visit, Indians attacked the J. M. White party along the Santa Fe Trail some eighty miles east of Rayado. Mr. White and five or six others died in the battle, while his wife and small daughter were apparently captured by Apache. New Mexico Indian Superintendent James S. Calhoun took immediate steps to recover the two. A $1,000 reward was offered for their return. Captain (Brevet Major) William S. Grier and a company of dragoons set out from Taos to pursue the raiders. When the troops reached Rayado, Carson joined them.

For almost two weeks the soldiers followed Indian trails across the barren plains of northeastern New Mexico. At last they sighted the camp of what were presumed to be the guilty Apache. The troops halted to prepare for a parley, giving the Indians time to begin packing and preparing for battle. Suddenly a bullet hit Grier, miraculously embedding itself in his coat so that he suffered only surface injury. In the confusion the natives rode away with the loss of only one warrior. In the debris left behind Carson and the others found the body of Mrs. White. Nearby lay a popular novel extolling the heroism of Carson, who at least this time had failed in his mission. No trace of the child was ever found.[19]

The White massacre fully convinced United States officials of the need to station troops along the frontier. If Grier and his men had been nearer the scene of attack, they could have saved a great deal of time and perhaps have rescued Mrs. White and her daughter. Rayado was the logical site for the army to stay. No doubt encouraged by Beaubien, Maxwell, and Carson, the commanding officer agreed to station ten mounted dragoons under Sergeant William C. "Leigh" Holbrook at the frontier settlement.[20] Their presence contributed much to the pacification of the area.

During the winter cold and snow apparently restrained the Apache, but peace suddenly ended on April 5, 1850. They attacked a vulnerable outpost three miles from Rayado where horses and mules were grazing. Two of Maxwell's Spanish-American

herders received wounds, while nearly all the riding stock in the area was driven off. No sooner had daylight come the next morning than Holbrook and his troops, accompanied by Carson, galloped off in pursuit of the enemy. Twenty miles from Rayado they sighted the raiders. "We approached the Indians cautiously," Carson reported, "and when close, charged them." Five Apache were killed and one or two others wounded. The only American loss was one horse shot out from under Private Richart. The successful soldiers returned to Rayado with all but four of the stolen animals. They carried five Indian scalps as gruesome trophies of their victory. "I regard the affair as a very handsome one," wrote Captain Grier, "and very creditable to the sergeant and his men."[21]

The proven ability of the army in subduing the Apache and protecting the settlement at Rayado persuaded military officials to establish a permanent station on the Beaubien grant. Necessary orders having been issued on May 24, 1850, Grier reached the new "Post at Rayado" with 43 men from Companies G and I of the 1st Dragoons.[22] Forty-five horses gave them needed mobility to pursue hostile Indians. Each soldier carried a carbine, while the detachment also had a six-pound cannon and a mountain howitzer. At first the troops lived in tents, apparently located along the Rayado east of the main complex. Maxwell soon agreed to quarter them in the building under construction as his residence. The officers had already moved in by early fall, and it was expected that the enlisted men would join them shortly.[23]

In addition to providing protection, the military post also added appreciably to the revenue at Rayado. At first Maxwell agreed to rent quarters and stables for $2,400 per year, but soon the price rose to $3,400. Many supplies were also purchased locally. For example the army contracted in 1850 to buy an unspecified amount of hay for $20 per ton; the following year, it decided that Rayado was the best location to graze all the surplus government stock in the territory. As a result purchases totalled six hundred tons, with the price increased to $30. Wheat had been planted on most of the irrigated land, so corn had to be purchased in Taos at a cost of $2 per bushel. The quartermaster thought that if orders

were placed early enough, grain could be grown at Rayado, thus increasing the quantity available and lowering the price. Apparently this did not happen, for the next year grain still had to be secured in Taos and packed forty miles across the mountains. The cost rose by fifty cents a bushel. The military also provided employment for five civilians, three as herders and two as teamsters. An inspector visiting the post a year after its founding suggested that although the location seemed wise from a military standpoint, it was "somewhat expensive" to maintain.[24]

That such large expenditures were justifiable became increasingly evident during the summer and fall of 1850. Within a few weeks after the post was established, Indians variously described as Ute or Apache once again attacked. On June 26 they drove off a large herd of Maxwell's livestock grazing almost within sight of the main buildings. Six horses, four mules, and 175 head of cattle valued at more than $5,000 were lost.[25] In addition, an army bugler who had left camp unarmed was found dead, together with a civilian,[26] probably the "brave and experienced" trapper, William New.[27] Such a daring raid convinced many New Mexicans that the small, ineffective forays against the Apache must end. Instead, a group of citizens including Maxwell, Beaubien, and Carson, petitioned Governor John Munroe for a full-scale expedition to end the Indian menace forever.[28]

The governor responded favorably. By late July 1850, one of the largest Indian campaigns carried out in northern New Mexico left Rayado. Brevet Major Grier commanded the two companies already stationed at Rayado, plus Company K of the Second Dragoons sent from Las Vegas.[29] In addition, Munroe authorized the use of ninety civilians from "Loda Mora" with officers of their own choosing. The entire party, totaling over 150 men, headed north along the Sangre de Cristos to the Vermejo River, then moved westward into the mountains, where they sighted an Apache trail. Late one night Lieutenant Adams attacked a small band of Indians, killing or wounding all of them and capturing their animals. An advance party of Spanish-Americans sighted and attacked another camp that same night. The next day the main

body was at last spotted "on the edge of a mountain, in a thick and almost impenetrable growth of aspens." The surrounding area was so marshy and full of springs that mounting an attack would be difficult. Before the troops could be brought into position, the Apache sensed their presence, hurriedly abandoned camp, and fled higher into the mountains. Pursuit proved fruitless, although five or six Indian casualties were counted. One soldier, Sergeant Lewis V. Guthrie, who received a mortal wound during the fray, died the next day. Even though the Apache had not been dealt the blow many New Mexicans hoped for, the expedition did recover many horses, sheep, mules, and cattle stolen from Rayado and other settlements.[30] Grier's superiors must have been satisfied with these results, for soon after the soldiers returned, their commander received orders to plan to remain at Maxwell's ranch for a year.[31] The army had come to the eastern side of the Sangre de Cristos to stay.

In addition to pursuing Apache through the mountains, Grier had other more mundane but (at least by army standards) equally important concerns during late summer. An army inspector would soon visit his command. The soldiers devoted much time to cleaning guns, practicing maneuvers, and straightening up quarters for the arrival of Inspector General George A. McCall on September 16. McCall commented very favorably on what he found. Special praise went to Grier, who appeared "to have discharged his duties with zeal and ability." The post itself presented a pleasing appearance, especially in light of the short time since it had been established. But for an officer who equated spit and polish with efficiency and effectiveness, the troops presented a very sad appearance. No new clothing had been issued for several months, so that many of the uniforms did "not conform to regulations." Probably because they had just opened a new post on the frontier and carried out a series of campaigns against hostile Indians, the soldiers had devoted insufficient time to perfecting their formal drill. Marching techniques were, the inspector reported, "by no means perfect." In a classic understatement McCall described the men's appearance as "becoming hard service rather than parade duty."[32]

Grier must have taken such criticism seriously, for as soon as McCall left the soldiers began devoting more of their time to drill. A new private, James A. Bennett, who transferred to Rayado late in October 1850, expressed surprise that a frontier commander put so much emphasis on the "cleaning of arms, brushing of clothes, grooming of horses [and] burnishing of leather." No sooner had he arrived than Grier scheduled a full-dress review for 8:00 in the morning. Each new arrival answered to his name, after which the entire command paraded for an hour. Then Grier, who reminded Bennett of "a fatherly old man who was designed for a Methodist minister but whose patriotic spirit exceeded his religious zeal," delivered a long lecture. Thereafter, the men spent two hours every day practicing their horsemanship by riding around in a circle "at all gaits, without stirrups." Not until snow started falling in mid-November did the routine change. The men hoped that during the winter they could spend more time in their quarters. Bennett planned to learn Spanish.[33]

Such was not to be the case, however, for the coming of winter only increased the difficulties along New Mexico's northeastern frontier. When the eastern mail reached the area, for example, an escort from Rayado rode into two feet of snow to accompany it to Santa Fe. Similarly, the soldiers guided the army paymaster and his wagon train across the Raton Mountains in January 1851. Heavy snows made it almost impossible to pull the cumbersome wagons over the pass, but after several days, the cold, tired troops reached the summit and sent the paymaster into Colorado. Bennett complained about his conditions: "work hard all day in the snow; at night make a bed on a bank that would bury a man." And no time to learn Spanish! The return trip almost ended in tragedy when the soldiers decided to try a new route back to Rayado and became lost in a storm. By the time their guide found some trees in which to seek shelter, twenty men were so cold that they needed help in dismounting. A week after returning to the warmth of their quarters, the men faced still another dangerous trip across the mountains to take Dr. David Magruder to Taos.[34]

In between escort duties, the soldiers also defended the settlements along the Sangre de Cristos. The coming of winter drew large numbers of wolves out of the mountains to attack livestock belonging to Maxwell and others. Frequently the troops pursued packs of as many as two hundred of these hungry beasts. Nor did the cold weather totally eliminate the Indian menace. Late in November a herder reported that four hundred head of cattle had been driven off. Carson, who spent most of the winter at Rayado, led the soldiers seventy miles in pursuit. When they found the Indian camp and the stolen cows, baskets filled with milk hung in nearby trees. Bennett was convinced that the Apache were going "into the darying business pretty largely." In the brief battle that followed, seven Indians were killed and one child taken captive. All the livestock was recovered and returned to its owner.[35]

Despite the difficulties of winter duty in northeastern New Mexico, the troops did not spend every day working. March 10 the paymaster arrived at Rayado, providing the men with money for the first time in months. A celebration quickly developed; soon an all-night card game had commenced in the enlisted men's quarters. "Money exchanged hands as fast as possible," Bennett recalled. The winners exhibited a peculiarly "fiendish smile," while anyone who lost cursed "himself, his parents, and his God for his evil fortune." By morning every man had lost a night of sleep and many were missing several months' pay.[36]

Two events during the spring forecast changes in the military posture in northern New Mexico. Early in April, Grier, who had commanded at Rayado since the post was founded, relinquished command to Captain Richard Stoddard Ewell, who had been on detached service in Virginia.[37] Ewell, who joined the Confederate forces during the Civil War and became known as one of the South's most effective commanders, was much less willing to guard a minor frontier settlement than had been his predecessor. He may well have questioned the need for continuing the post. Such thoughts may also have occurred to his superiors as evidence grew of poor morale among the troops at Rayado. By early spring seven

privates and two enlisted men had been imprisoned; two others had deserted. The exact details of the difficulties are unknown, but when a general court martial convened at Rayado in April, five of the men were ordered discharged.[38] Whatever the reason, such a high percentage of troublesome soldiers required some consideration.

Perhaps as a result of these events, as well as the high cost of maintaining troops at Maxwell's and the inability of the military to win a decisive victory against the Indians, the army began to investigate the desirability of discontinuing the post. On March 12, 1851, Lieutenant John G. Parke, later famed for his surveys of railroad routes across southern Arizona, was ordered to "make a particular examination" of the Rayado area to determine if it was the best site to station soldiers. He was to take into consideration the available supplies of wood and water as well as the area's capacity for farming and grazing livestock. Most important, he was to evaluate the military advantages of the location, for his superiors wanted to be certain that soldiers there could operate "over the greatest area of country & on the essential points in the most prudent and effective manner."[39]

Parke's report, submitted in mid-April 1851, dealt a blow to Post Rayado which hostile natives and inclement weather had failed to strike. He was particularly concerned that the post was presently located in an area between the mountains and the plains where mesas of varying elevations surrounded it on all sides. Trees and scrubby brush provided excellent cover for Indians approaching the area. A surprise attack would be difficult to detect. Moreover, the garrison had an "extremely limited view" of the surrounding countryside. For these reasons Parke felt that it was militarily inadvisable to continue the post at its current location. Instead, he recommended a site between the Cimarron and Ponil creeks ten miles to the north.[40]

Parke completed his report just as Colonel E. V. Sumner arrived in New Mexico to take command of the Ninth Military Department. Rather than spread his forces out among a number of small posts, he decided to consolidate men and reduce costs by locating

one large fort on the Mora River thirty miles south of Rayado. In mid-May 1851 part of the Rayado detachment went to the new location to begin building Fort Union.[41] Two months later, on July 25, Sumner ordered the post at Rayado broken up. Ewell's men should move immediately to Fort Union with all public property.[42] Maxwell pleaded that since he had agreed to accompany Major John Pope to lay out a new trail to Fort Leavenworth, the military ought to provide some protection for his settlement. Sumner did agree to station fifteen men at Rayado if Maxwell would provide them with free quarters and stabling,[43] but no arrangement could apparently be worked out. On August 31 the post was abandoned.[44]

The increasingly secure status of the Rayado settlement was evidenced by the willingness of both Maxwell and Carson to leave the area for long periods. During much of the summer of 1851 the two men headed a party of eighteen trappers who went to Colorado and Wyoming.[45] Two years later Carson purchased 6,500 head of sheep which he drove to California. Maxwell followed close behind with a second herd. The pair met in San Francisco, returning to New Mexico by Christmas 1853.[46] Thereafter Carson moved back to Taos, where the government employed him as agent to the Ute and Apache.[47]

Especially when the men were gone, the village along the Rayado was still vulnerable to Indian attack. On one occasion a German boy sent to get water from the creek for breakfast ran in screaming that he had seen Indians. Soon a large Cheyenne war party appeared at the gate demanding food. Mountaineer Tom Boggs, who was staying at the ranch recommended that rather than try to fight off the Indians, the residents should feed them while one man rode to Fort Union for troops. Teresina Bent recalled what followed:

> So we women all set to work cooking—coffee and meat and whatever else we had. I was twelve years old, and the chief of the war party saw me and wanted to buy me to make me his wife. He kept offering horses—ten, fifteen, twenty horses. Mr. Boggs said for us to act friendly with the Indians and not make the chief angry. My, I was so

> frightened! And while I carried platters of food from the kitchen, the tears were running down my cheeks. That made the chief laugh. He was bound to buy me, and when they all got through eating he said that they would wait; if I was not delivered to him by the time the sun touched a hill there in the west he would take me by force.

The Cheyenne camped just outside the compound awaiting the setting sun. Within the adobe walls, the little girl helped the women carry bullets to the few men who were present. Just as the moment of attack neared, Carson and a company of soldiers rode dramatically up the road from Fort Union. The Indians fled before them. "I was so glad," remembered Teresina; "I did not want to go with the dirty chief."[48]

A similar story, perhaps legendary, involved Vidal Trujillo, who had married Beaubien's daughter Leonora and was also living at Rayado. One morning a small party of Apache appeared on a hill north of Rayado. Two men who went to see what they wanted were fired upon and fled to the safety of the compound. Suddenly six hundred warriors topped the hill. Conditions were critical since most of the men had left, and ammunition was scarce. Someone would have to ride to Fort Union for the soldiers. Vidal Trujillo volunteered. The mount he chose was Rayado, a fine race horse named for the ranch. The great gate flew open and out sped horse and rider:

> Like a thunderbolt the big chesnut horse shot into the midst of the circling savages. Crouched low over his withers, Vidal, a professional jockey, guided him through the savages in the greatest race of his career. So unexpected the act, and so complete the surprise, the flying rider was through the line before the Indians knew what was happening. . . . Fate rode with Vidal Trujillo that day. Miraculously he escaped their missles, and by virtue of the great horse under him, outran them.

Never daring to spare his animal, Trujillo pushed on as rapidly as possible. When he reached Fort Union, Rayado fell dead beneath

him. The soldiers immediately departed for the north, but when they reached the settlement, the Indians had given up their siege and fled. Once more Rayado was secure.[49]

In April of 1854, however, many New Mexicans thought that the Indians had at last succeeded in overpowering the residents of Rayado. A report reached Santa Fe that Apache had attacked the ranch and killed all of its inhabitants. Eight women, ten men including Maxwell, and two or three children were dead.[50]

No such massacre actually occurred, but Carson, fearful that one might take place at any moment, appealed for troops. Addressing acting territorial Governor William S. Messervy in June, he reported that more than $100,000 in livestock was on the Rayado. Moving them to a more secure location was impossible because of a shortage of grass; many residents of the village would lose everything if they were forced to leave. Already large bands of Indians had menaced the area. He warned that further trouble was likely unless government forces were sent soon. At the same time these soldiers could provide needed protection for the mail route across the plains and the Bent's Fort road from Raton Pass.[51]

Carson's appeal brought quick action from army officials in New Mexico. On July 16, 1854, Lieutenant J. W. Davidson established temporary camp at Rayado with sixty-one men from the First Dragoons. Apparently no major attack occurred, and the army was not convinced of the continuing need for troops in the area. On September 6 orders were issued to abandon the camp. On the 18th the troops left.[52]

Principally because of the continuing support of the United States army and the perseverance of the early settlers, Rayado had become well established by the mid-1850's. Maxwell had erected a large complex including living quarters, storage, and work rooms, surrounded by a protective wall.[53] Other buildings increased the total value of his improvements to an estimated $15,000. Some two hundred acres of land had been put under cultivation. Fifteen thousand head of livestock grazed along the Sangre de Cristos.[54] Occasionally Indians still raided the area,[55] but no tribe could

mount an offensive sufficient to drive out the settlers. More farmers and ranchers continually arrived, until eventually all of northeastern New Mexico had been settled.

Rayado's position as the major settlement on the Beaubien grant was short-lasting. In 1857 Maxwell decided to move his residence to the banks of the Cimarron River, near the location which Parke had recommended for an army post. His ranch there grew and prospered, especially after the government located the Ute and Apache Indian agency there in 1861. Rayado, first operated by José Pley and later by another Beaubien son-in-law, Jesús G. Abreu,[56] diminished in importance. Today several of the buildings erected during the early 1850's remain, but fewer than a dozen people call Rayado home. Only a nearby museum maintained by the Philmont Scout Ranch reminds visitors of the historic importance of the settlement beside the Rayado.

NOTES

1. Alfred B. Thomas, *After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727* (Norman, 1935), pp. 25, 40, 45-46.

2. Lawrence R. Murphy, "The Beaubien and Miranda Land Grant, 1841-1846," NMHR, vol. 42 (1967), pp. 27-47.

3. For vivid descriptions of the area during the Mexican War, see Lewis H. Garrard, *Wah-to-yah and the Taos Trail* (Norman, 1955), pp. 144-49, 230-32.

4. A recent sketch of Maxwell by Harvey Carter in LeRoy Hafen, ed., *The Mountain Men and the Fur Trade of the Far West* (Glendale, 1968), vol. 6, pp. 299-306, outlines the major aspects of Maxwell's long and colorful career, although it depends far too heavily on the sometimes unreliable F. W. Cragin papers. Also see Harold H. Dunham, "Lucien B. Maxwell: Frontiersman and Businessman," Denver Westerners' *Brand Book,* vol. 5 (1949), pp. 1-22. Readers should also anticipate a forthcoming full-length biography by Taos author Marion M. Estergreen.

5. Testimony of Calvin Jones in *Transcript of Record,* U.S. vs. Maxwell Land Grant Co., et al., Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1886, no. 974, p. 72, in Record Group 267, National Archives. (Hereinafter cited as Maxwell case *Transcript.*) The exact date of the establishment of Rayado is extremely uncertain. For further, often contradictory, evidence, see: *Transcript of Title of the Maxwell Land Grant* (Chicago, 1881), and *Transcript of Record of Charles Bent, et al. vs. Guadalupe Miranda et al.* (Santa Fe, 1894). (Hereinafter cited as Bent case *Transcript.*) Among major secondary works dealing with the subject are W. A. Keleher, *The Maxwell Land Grant: A New Mexico Item* (Santa Fe, 1942, reprinted New York, 1964), p. 29; F. Stanley, *The Grant that Maxwell Bought* (Denver, 1952), pp. 21-22; Jim B. Pearson, *The Maxwell Land Grant* (Norman, 1961), p. 11; and Edwin L. Sabin, *Kit Carson Days,* 2 vols. (New York, 1935), vol. 2, pp. 616-18.

6. Janet Lecompte, "The Manco Burro Pass Massacre," NMHR, vol. 41 (1966), p. 316, n. 12.

7. Jones testimony, Maxwell case *Transcript,* p. 72.

8. Lecompte, p. 316, n. 12.

9. Louise Barry, ed., "Kansas Before 1854: A Revised Annals," *Kansas Historical Quarterly,* vol. 31 (1965), pp. 163-64.

10. Claim of Maxwell and James H. Quinn for indemnities in "Report of the Secretary of the Interior Made in Conformity to Law Upon Claims for Depredations by Indians in the Territory of New Mexico," *Senate Ex.*

Doc. 55, 35th Cong., 1 sess., p. 11. (Hereinafter cited as Claims for Depredations by Indians.)

11. Lecompte, pp. 311-14. Another account, differing considerably in detail, is in Howard Conard, *"Uncle Dick" Wootton* (Chicago, 1890), pp. 214-17.

12. *Santa Fe Republican,* July 8, 19, 1848, p. 3.

13. Interview with Jesse Nelson, July 9, 1908, Notebook VIII, p. 6, F. W. Cragin papers, Pioneers' Museum, Colorado Springs. Nelson also recalled that the army supply agent "gave Maxwell a lift by giving him double (100% profit) on forage" for Fort Union. Since that post would not be established until 1851, the entire story is suspect. Carter, "Lucien Maxwell," p. 303, accepts its accuracy.

14. John C. Fremont to his wife Jesse, Taos, January 27, 1849, printed in John Bigelow, *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of John Charles Fremont* (New York, 1856), p. 371. While Fremont is not clear as to whether Maxwell was in Beaubien's Taos store or on the Rayado, my interpretation follows Dunham, "Lucien B. Maxwell," p. 7. Carter, "Lucien Maxwell" apparently believed that Maxwell did not settle on the Rayado until 1849. Also see LeRoy R. and Ann W. Hafen, eds., *Fremont's Fourth Expedition, The Far West and the Rockies Historical Series,* vol. 11 (Glendale, 1960), p. 298.

15. Bigelow, *Fremont,* pp. 372-73.

16. The most recent edition of Carson's autobiography is in Harvey L. Carter, *"Dear Old Kit:" The Historical Kit Carson* (Norman, 1968). The quotation is from pp. 123-24.

17. Testimony of William A. Bransford, Faustin Jaramillo, and Calvin Jones, Maxwell Case *Transcript,* pp. 59, 62, 72; also the Jones testimony in Bent case *Transcript,* pp. 155-56.

18. Anna P. Hannum, ed., *A Quaker Forty-Niner: The Adventures of Charles Edward Pancoast on the American Frontier* (Philadelphia, 1930), p. 178.

19. Contemporary descriptions of the White massacre are in James S. Calhoun to W. Medill, Santa Fe, October 29, 1848, in Annie H. Abel, ed., *The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun* (Washington, 1915), pp. 63-66. Also see Carter, *"Dear Old Kit,"* pp. 124-26.

20. Carter, *"Dear Old Kit,"* p. 126.

21. Holbrook to Grier, Rayado, April 7, 1850, and Grier to John Munroe, Taos, April 12, 1850, in "Report of the Secretary of War, 1850," *House Ex. Doc. 1,* 31st Cong., 1 sess., pp. 70-71.

22. Return of Troops at Rayado, N.M., May 1850, in Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, R. G. 94, National Archives. (Hereinafter

cited as Rayado Post Returns.) From a contemporary newspaper account describing Maxwell's house as a "quazi fort," several amateur historians have named the post at Rayado Fort Quazi! The most recent example is in Tom Hilton, *Nevermore, Cimarron, Nevermore* (Fort Worth, 1970), p. 13.

23. George A. McCall, *New Mexico in 1850: A Military View,* ed. by Robert W. Frazer (Norman, 1968), pp. 145-50.

24. *Ibid.,* and Thomas Swords to Thomas S. Jessup, New York, October 25, 1871, in "Report of the Secretary of War, 1851," *Senate Ex. Doc. 1,* 32nd Cong., 1 sess., p. 235.

25. Claim of Maxwell and Quinn in Claims for Depredations by Indians, p. 441.

26. Calhoun to Brown, Santa Fe, July 15, 1850, in Abel, *Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun,* pp. 216-17, and Return of Troops at Rayado, N. M., June 1850, Rayado Post Returns.

27. Carter, *"Dear Old Kit,"* p. 127. For a sketch of New containing a highly fictionalized account of his death from Peters' biography of Carson, see Harvey L. Carter, "Bill New," in Hafen, ed., *Mountain Men,* vol. 5, pp. 249-54. Carter argues that New was killed at Rayado in May 1850.

28. The undated petition is printed in Abel, *Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun,* pp. 230-31.

29. Return of Troops at Rayado, N. M., July 1850, Rayado Post Returns.

30. Grier to McLaws, Rayado, July 21, 1850, in Report of the Secretary of War, 1850, pp. 74-75.

31. McCall, *New Mexico in 1850,* p. 146.

32. The full report is in *ibid.,* pp. 145-53.

33. Clinton E. Brooks and Frank D. Reeve, eds., *Forts and Forays, James A. Bennett: A Dragoon in New Mexico, 1850-1856* (Albuquerque, 1948), pp. 16-17.

34. *Ibid.,* pp. 17-18, 21-22.

35. *Ibid.,* p. 18.

36. *Ibid.,* pp. 22-23.

37. Return of Troops at Rayado, N. M., April, 1851, Rayado Post Returns.

38. Return of Troops at Rayado, N. M., May 1851, *ibid.*

39. L. M. Laws to John G. Parke, March 12, 1851, in 9th Military Department Orders, R. G. 98, National Archives.

40. Parke to Laws, April 14, 1851, in Letters Received, 9th Military Department, R. G. 94, National Archives.

41. Brooks and Reeve, *Forts and Forays,* p. 26.

42. Order No. 19, July 25, 1851, 9th Military Department Orders,

R. G. 98, National Archives. Also Chris Emmett, *Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest* (Norman, 1965), p. 14.

43. Sumner to Ewell, July 26, 1851, in 9th Military Department Orders, vol. 7, p. 215, R. G. 98, National Archives; Emmett, *Fort Union,* p. 14.

44. Francis P. Prucha, *Guide to the Military Posts of the United States* (Madison, 1964), p. 101.

45. Carter, *"Dear Old Kit,"* p. 132.

46. *Ibid.,* pp. 132-33. Also see the *Placerville Herald,* July 2, 1853, p. 1, and the *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette,* December 31, 1853, p. 2.

47. *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette,* May 26, 1853, p. 2, and January 14, 1854, p. 2.

48. Quoted in Sabin, *Kit Carson Days,* vol. 2, pp. 632-33.

49. J. Ralph Gett, "The Rayado Ranch," *Western Empire: The Development Magazine,* pp. 10-11, undated copy in the Western History Department, Denver Public Library.

50. *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette,* April 8, 1854, p. 2.

51. Carson to Messervy, Fernando de Taos, June 25, 1854, in Records of the New Mexico Superintendency of Indian Affairs, R.G. 75, National Archives.

52. Return of Troops at Rayado, N. M., July and August 1854, Rayado Post Returns.

53. Interview with Beaubien's grandson, the late Narciso M. Abreu, by Harry G. McGavran, M.D., at Rayado, July 1960, tape recording in the E. T. Seton Library, Philmont Scout Ranch, Cimarron. For a fictionalized description of the compound accompanied by an extremely imaginative sketch, see DeWitt C. Peters, *Pioneer Life and Frontier Adventures . . . Kit Carson and His Companions from his Own Narrative* (Boston, 1883), pp. 335-36.

54. Testimony of Carson, July 28, 1857, in *Transcript of Title,* p. 23.

55. For example, see Carson to S. M. Yost, Taos, January 5, 1858, and to James L. Collins, Taos, February 23, 1859, in Records of the New Mexico Superintendency.

56. Apparently Pley operated the ranch from the time of Maxwell's departure until February 1860, when he returned to his home in Spain. An agreement between Pley and Abreu dated February 22, 1860, transferring the property, is in the collection of Harry G. McGavran, Jr., Los Alamos, New Mexico.

THE NEW MEXICO MINING COMPANY

JOHN TOWNLEY

IN A PROCLAMATION written to assure the inhabitants of New Mexico that the bloodless American occupation of 1846 was not to be the precursor of rapine and religious oppression, Brigadier General Stephen W. Kearny guaranteed ". . . to protect the persons and property of all quiet and peaceable inhabitants."[1] However, if the native militia had had some foreknowledge of the drastic shift in real and personal property from local to Anglo hands in the century following the Mexican War, the defense of the province might have been much more spirited.

Almost any traveler to New Mexico during the period of Mexican sovereignty commented at length on the possibilities of developing the resources of the area. Just a month before the arrival of Kearny's Army of the West, it had been noted that the placer gold deposits south of Santa Fe needed only the application of intelligence and energy to reward the entrepreneur handsomely:

> The old Placer is a very promising place for mines. The gold ores there were discovered by mere accident in 1828, and gold washings established; but besides that, the ground is barely touched, and will yet open rich treasures to the mining enchanter, who knows how to unlock them.[2]

The traveler, Dr. Wislizenus, was correct in his analysis of the possibilities of Old Placers, but he could not have foreseen that the deposit, like so many of the resources of the province, was to profit territorial officers rather than the professional miner.

The gold deposits of the Oso, later Ortiz, mountains were discovered in 1828.[3] Just twenty-five miles south of Santa Fe, they consisted of both lode and placer occurrences. A rush of men and families from New Mexico and other northern Mexican states presaged events in California two decades later. Most of the argonauts chose to work the placer deposits of Arroyo Viejo, though there were a few lode mining operations.

In 1833 the commander of the garrison established at Arroyo Viejo, Lt. don José Francisco Ortiz, was granted some six hundred varas (about 1,500 linear feet) along the Santa Rosalía outcrop. To support this mining venture, Ortiz requested rights to water, pasturage, and use of any natural resource on four square leagues (approximately 100 square miles) of territory surrounding the portal of the mine.[4] The grant of surface rights was approved, but did not prevent other miners in the district from utilizing the same privileges. Exclusive use of the area incorporated in the grant was never claimed by Ortiz, who did not question joint occupation of the territory. The grant stipulated that surface rights alone were awarded, and these would revert to the state upon the conclusion of mining activity.

Between 1833 and 1846 the Ortiz mine was the largest producer of bullion among the lode properties of the district. Ortiz operated a mercantile store in addition to his continuing duties as commander of the garrison. The community of Dolores grew up around Ortiz' headquarters at Oso Spring. A mill, store, and family home were built at the site and many other individuals involved in local mining chose to center their activities in the same vicinity. The remains of the structures are plainly evident today. Ore from the Ortiz mine was brought down the mountain by mule and stockpiled until sufficient was present to justify a run through the arrastras.[5]

Ortiz lived in Dolores until 1840. At that time, he built a home in Santa Fe on the present site of the Federal Post Office and divided his time between the capital and Dolores. In 1842 he was on active duty during the Texan invasion and leased the mine during his absence. Again called to duty in 1846, Ortiz was officer of the

day when James Magoffin and Captain Philip St. George Cooke arrived ahead of Kearny's army to confer with Governor Armijo. The emissaries were offered the hospitality of the Ortiz home and resided there during the secret negotiations.[6] Following the war, Ortiz continued to reside in Santa Fe and died there on July 22, 1848, leaving his estate to his wife.

To the incoming American administrators of the province, the presence of a large, and equally profitable, gold deposit near enough to the capital to be secure from Indian attack, offered obvious opportunites for development. The first mission of the officers of the Corps of Topographical Engineers was to survey and evaluate mining possibilities.[7]

Nevertheless, despite continued investigation and some slight American participation in lode mining, the situation at Old Placers remained unchanged until 1854. The few hundred placer miners resident in the district continued to wash the alluvial deposits in the time-honored ways, and the lode mines produced fitfully, if at all. One reason for the lack of enterprise might have been the preoccupation with California and migration of many of the native miners to that area.

In 1853 John Greiner, ex-Indian Agent and then Secretary of New Mexico Territory, succeeded in purchasing the Ortiz Grant from Maraquita Montoya, Ortiz' widow. The sale was registered in Santa Fe in December 1853 but had been made earlier in the year. Greiner had climbed the territorial bureaucratic ladder, beginning in 1851 with his appointment as Indian Agent. Soon afterwards he became acting Superintendent of Indian Affairs, then was named Territorial Secretary in September 1852.[8] Although he held the second highest administrative post in the territory, Greiner always had an eye on the main chance.

As early as January 1852 only six months after obtaining office, he had written business connections in his native Ohio regarding the possibilities of the Placers.[9] Three months later, he sent samples of gold recovered from the mines to a fellow politician, Elisha Whittlesey, and suggested a plan to gain title to the properties. A letter to Whittlesey outlined his intentions:


To Santa Fe
6000'
Rio Galisteo
Cerrillos
ORTIZ
MINE
Arroyo Viejo
Dolores
Ortiz Mountain
Mine
10
7000
GRANT
"New Placers"
San Pedro
San Pedro Mine
To Albuquerque
SCALE 1:250,000
0
5

> Having long had a desire to secure an interest in the celebrated Placer Gold Mines, twenty-seven miles south of Santa Fe, by far the richest of any mines in the Territory, and supposed to be, by those best acquainted with them, equal to any in California, I was glad to learn that an opportunity offered of getting the control of the whole of the Placer Mountains, and at once made every effort to accomplish the object.[10]

By the summer of 1853, Whittlesey had formed a company in Ohio and collected the funds necessary to purchase the Ortiz grant. Greiner was advised and entered into negotiations with Ortiz' widow, Maraquita Montoya. The purchase was made in Greiner's name and it is doubtful that he disclosed his agentship for the Ohio group. On August 9, 1854, the transfer of the property from Greiner to the New Mexico Mining Company was made. In a letter to Whittlesey dated February 22, 1854, Greiner described the purchase:

> The Santa Rosalia Mine, owned by Ortiz, was the first one discovered, and was assigned to him by the Mexican Government, with two leagues square of land and the Oso spring of water, Ortiz having taken every precaution to hold possession according to law. Dying without issue, he left his wife, by will, heir to all his property, among which was the right, title etc., to the Placer mine. These papers I purchased, and took from the widow a warranty deed for the mine, the spring of water, the land, and a large house, in good repair, standing at the village near the mines.[11]

Greiner left New Mexico, and his office, shortly after concluding the sale and transfer. He returned within a few years and was again appointed to office in 1864 as Disbursing Officer of the U.S. Depository and Receiver of the U.S. Land Office.[12] An inheritance of $130,000 caused him to return east in 1866.

The New Mexico Mining Company was a privately held firm. Acting upon Greiner's enthusiastic recommendations, the Ohio-based concern believed that the necessary capital to develop the

Ortiz lode could be raised among the few partners and the resulting profits distributed without recourse to corporate organization. It was hoped that once the mine was brought into production, the capital for further improvements would come from the proceeds of the mill.

The company representative during 1854-1858 was N. M. Miller. He undertook to salvage the buildings and equipment that had been left at the mine and millsite when the Ortiz lessees terminated their operations in 1842. Miller's decision, based on the amount of capital at his disposal, was to continue the simple milling procedures followed by Ortiz and to carefully explore the lode in an effort to find and work only the best quality ore.

The Ortiz vein was dry to the depth of 150 feet and the gold mineralization was uncomplicated by the presence of other metals. It was easily separated by mercury amalgamation after being crushed. Ore occurred in discontinuous chimneys and pockets. They were often connected by thin veinlets of high-grade ore, but frequently were self-contained and isolated. The first discoveries were outcrops of the upper portions of several pockets which were followed underground and the best rock stoped out. Miller stripped out what remained of the Mexican ore bodies and put several men to crosscutting along the vein in an effort to discover new bonanzas. The ore contained an average of three ounces of gold to the ton and brought $60 at the Mint or $100 in greenback dollars.

The arrastras at Oso Spring were cleaned and repaired, while the house was converted into offices and living quarters for the superintendent. As during the Ortiz regime, ore came down the mile-and-a-half trail by mule and was stockpiled until the mill was activated. Between 1854 and 1858 the company financed the limited operations through income and contributions from the partners. Production was steady, but was never enough to build up the funds necessary to purchase equipment and hire crews for systematic exploration underground.

During this period, a cavalry trooper recorded an overnight stay at the Placers in his diary:

> August 3. With Captain Ewell en route for Santa Fe. Last night camped at the Placer Mine. Now worked by two Americans. I descended into the excavation 700 feet [?] below the surface by means of a windlass and bucket. Saw them wash out of one panful of dirt $15. It was done in less than ten minutes.[13]

By 1858, the partnership agreed that incorporation was the answer to their dilemma. The question was how to proceed; the act required passage by the Territorial Legislature. The solution was to make most of the officers of the Territory and influential legislators stockowners in the proposed company.

The first section of the proposed act to incorporate the New Mexico Mining Company listed Abraham Rencher, then governor, Henry Connelly and Miguel A. Otero as prominent stockholders. Only the larger holders were listed and it can be assumed that many of the five thousand, $100-par shares had been distributed among the members of the legislature. The bill was passed and approved on February 1, 1858. Sale of the shares occupied the next eleven months, but on January 15, 1859, the company was "regularly organized at the Executive Office, the Governor of the Territory being present and presiding on the occasion."[14] There are few better auguries for a commercial enterprise than for its first official act to take place in a governor's office, with the governor heading its management, particularly when the governor is a leading shareholder.

During the biennium 1859-1860, over $20,000 was invested in milling equipment at Oso Spring. A forty-five horsepower steam boiler and engine drove five stamps, which fed two enlarged arrastras that further crushed the ore.[15] Three other seeps were improved and channels cut from them to the pond created immediately below Oso Spring by an earthen dam. As capital flowed into the company treasury through sales of shares, the underground crews were enlarged, and both production and exploration rose significantly.

As an indication of the influence of the New Mexico Mining

Company in territorial politics, one can point to the confirmation of the company's title to the Ortiz grant by the Surveyor General's office in November 1860. John S. Watts, attorney for the firm, asked the Surveyor General of New Mexico to examine the title and forward his recommendations for confirmation to Congress. The request was made on November 8; by the 24th, after reviewing the deeds and hearing testimony from persons who had earlier participated in the sale of the grant to John Greiner, a favorable recommendation was forwarded to Congress.[16] This action was taken at a time when the Surveyor General was asking for additional staff to handle the heavy backlog of surveying and title-search duties inherent in his office.[17] This backlog did not prevent the New Mexico Mining Company case from being given the highest priority.

On March 1, 1861, Congress confirmed the grant as specified in the Surveyor General's recommendation and established its area as 69,458.33 acres. The bill that was submitted to Congress did not show the name of territorial Governor Abraham Rencher as one of the claimants. When the company requested an act of incorporation from the territorial legislature, Rencher's name was prominently displayed among the stockholders as an indication of the influence of the firm. However, it was omitted from the Special Act submitted to Congress, as were the names of any other appointive officer, then serving in New Mexico and having an interest in the corporation.

The process by which the grant was confirmed is perhaps legally questionable. Ortiz had been given subsurface rights in 1833 for only the Santa Rosalía vein. The use of the four square leagues had been awarded for support of the mining activity alone. Retention of the surface rights was dependent on continuing operation of the mine. This had been stipulated in the original grant. Should the mine be abandoned, the government would reclaim the area surrounding the mine and the rights to wood, water, and pasturage involved. No grant of subsurface rights to the added area was ever made or intended by the Mexican government.

Nevertheless, the Surveyor General, a political appointee, treated the grant as fully awarded to Ortiz in fee simple. His recommendation made no distinction between the mining claim and the grant of surface rights. The grant was treated as a single award. His survey was extended to include the full distance described in the original grant, notwithstanding the presence of private real property at Dolores and the mining claims of others who had worked in the district undisturbed in their possession since 1828. In fact, the company had taken particular care since obtaining title in 1854, not to question any of the titles to land belonging to families residing at Dolores or to miners working claims within the extended borders of the grant. Until Congress had confirmed their title, no adverse action was desired through the courts. Miners continued to come and go over any of the property claimed by the company without any attempt to limit access or claim trespass.

The legal actions taken by the company had been pursued apart from operations at the mine. Exploration had revealed several undiscovered ore shoots and production was favorable. The new milling equipment had increased the amount of rock that could be worked per day, so income was considerably higher and recovery better than by the arrastra separation process.

With the advent of steam power, the coal resources of the Madrid area were utilized. Coal was plentiful, of good quality, and near enough to be freighted handily.[18] The company opened a seam of anthracite and built a wagon road to connect the colliery with Dolores. Management said that coal was a better fuel and was half again as cheap as the piñon they had been using.[19] Following the example set by the mine, other enterprises in New Mexico began to experiment with coal as an alternative to wood.

Mining continued throughout 1860 and 1861. In 1862, for reasons that are not known, a lease of the grant was made to Samuel Ellison, then district court judge. Ellison continued the same practices followed by the company and paid a royalty on production. By working three shifts at the mine and mill, Ellison averaged $750 per day in gross output.[20] In less than five months,

the Confederate occupation of central New Mexico resulted in the abandonment of the district. Ellison accompanied the Union territorial government when it retreated from Santa Fe to Fort Union. The invasion brought mining to a halt for the next two years.

The first sign of renewed life in the New Mexico Mining Company came through an announcement that it intended to reopen the mines with "vigour."[21] The company profited from the large amounts of risk capital created by Civil War prosperity by kiting their stock in the east. In an effort to give an aura of scientific detachment to their enterprise, the company retained Professors E. T. Cox and R. E. Owen to make a report on the mining potential of New Mexico. The gentlemen arrived in Santa Fe in October 1864 and departed early in December. The optimistic conclusions of their report were used by the company to substantiate the claims put forth in puffery published for eastern investors.[22]

The renaissance in activity at Dolores was to include both the lode and placer resources of the grant. The principal stockholders in the NMMC were approached by George M. Willing, who had devised a means of bringing water from the Pecos River to the Placers by a combination of ditches and pipelines.[23] Willing estimated that over $350,000,000 could be recovered from the placer deposits near Dolores if they could be hydraulically worked as in California. An estimated $800,000 was needed to build the ditch and the same men who owned the lode deposits saw an opportunity to profit through developing the placers.

The company's first approach was to contact members of the territorial legislature privately and solicit their assistance in generating a loan to the company to be used in building the ditch. The case was fought in the newspapers and on the floor of the Assembly. The amount required was above the annual revenues of the territory and beyond the capacity of the populace to support. Finally, the proposal was dropped and the funds solicited through corporate ownership.

Beginning in 1867, a subsidiary company was formed to build the ditch and sell water to the NMMC. Titled the Pecos and Placer Mining and Ditch Company, an imposing name for a group

possessed of nothing more tangible than an idea, they succeeded in raising several thousand dollars and negotiated contracts for a few miles of the Pecos River portions of the ditch.[24] Appropriate celebrations were held when the first earth was turned, but lack of income soon forced construction to halt. The plan for bringing quantities of water to the Placers was exhumed several times in later years, but remained no more than a plan. The problems of obtaining rights-of-way and adequate financing always proved too formidable for private enterprise.

With placer mining beyond their ability to mechanize, the NMMC returned to the faithful lode deposits. A happy combination of adequate capitalization and capable management developed in 1865 and produced three years of bonanza for the firm. The boiler-room sales tactics by eastern brokers produced treasury receipts; and conflicts over policy within the territorial Indian agency resulted in Dr. Michael Steck's taking the post of mining superintendent. The operations of the company under his direction were to be the most profitable and energetic.

Steck began his administration of the grant by working to increase the monthly revenues by any means available.[25] Resigning the Indian Agentship in May 1865 he spent the first few weeks in Dolores reviewing the resources of the grant and assessing their marketability. Modifying the existing steam engine to serve as power for a sawmill, Steck produced dimension lumber for the undersupplied Santa Fe market.[26] Previously, planed lumber had to be brought overland by freight. Steck used timber from the Ortiz mountains to feed the sawmill, while he pushed rebuilding of the stamp mill and re-opening of the mine.

The hiatus in production from the Ellison lease in 1862 until 1865 had resulted in deterioration of the milling facilities and underground workings. Pending restoration of the mill, Steck directed the major efforts of company miners toward blocking out new deposits of free-milling ores. By April 1866 he had the mill operative and spent the rest of the year in milling rock as fast as it could be delivered to Dolores.[27]

The superintendent was careful not to fall victim to the trap that

so often condemned mining ventures. He made his primary expenditures in labor and milling costs, areas where the cost was quickly realized in the proceeds from the rock worked in the old five-stamp mill. The purchase of larger equipment was deferred until the ore reserves of the vein had been blocked out and potential profits estimated. The shaft and stope network was expanded and exploration drifts driven into heretofore unexplored parts of the lode. By October 1866 Steck had enlarged the stopes and reached the water level in the main shaft at 140 feet.[28]

In late December 1866 sufficient capital brought into the company treasury, combined with a two-year ore reserve blocked out, justified the procurement of additional stamping equipment. Steck traveled to St. Louis to place the orders. The St. Louis *Democrat* of January 11, 1867, noted his arrival with the following statement:

> Dr. Steck of the Placer Mining Company of New Mexico arrived last Friday with a considerable amount of gold dust. He left an order for a 10-stamp mill. It is said that the quartz of Placer Mountain, about thirty miles from Santa Fe, turns out some $300 per cord. With a small 5-stamp mill, Dr. Steck extracted 200 ounces in the space of two months. These mines have been worked, at times, for some 150 years. The present association is the result of efforts commenced five or six years ago, to establish a company for the reopening of the old works. Other lodes have been discovered in a westerly direction from this point, which give evidence of richness.[29]

After spending the winter months in the east, Dr. Steck returned to Santa Fe in May 1867. Anticipating the greater volume of rock that could be separated with fifteen stamps working, he began to stockpile ore at Dolores. By mid-summer, over eight hundred tons of $75 to $100 ore were waiting processing.[30] The new stamps were operating in August and the weekly cleanup of the mill totaled $1800.[31] Steck's efficiencies were favorably noticed by his erstwhile adversary, General Carleton, and the company was given a prominent place in the governor's message to the Assembly for 1867.

One of the major costs of operating the mine was transportation of the ores from the stopes to the mill. Traditionally the rock had

been carried by mule because the road down the mountain was almost impassable at best. The amount of ore that could be carried was low and was increased only by adding to the number of animals employed.

To reduce this cost, a narrow-gauge railroad was designed between the mine and mill. The trackway followed generally the old trail, and required less widening than a wagon road between the two points. When finished, the railroad was approximately one and a half miles long. Loaded cars came downhill under gravity, relying on brakes to keep speed to fifteen miles per hour. Dr. Steck set production at one hundred tons per day, which was five times the normal scale. The track was constructed of hardwood, with a metal strip nailed to the top. Two cars were used. The mill was fed adequately by this system, and worked at top capacity for the remainder of 1868.[32]

The profits accumulated during 1868 far surpassed those of any previous year. The dividends and bonuses collected during Steck's three years as superintendent enabled him to become financially independent. He requested to be relieved of his position and trained a Colonel Anderson, late of the Corps of Engineers, as his replacement. When Steck left New Mexico in late 1868, the position of the New Mexico Mining Company had never been stronger.

The flush condition of the company caused the new superintendent and directors to expand the operation without the careful estimation of ore reserves practiced by Steck. Anderson hired a new crew of miners to open stopes in the Brehm lode, a low-grade, free-milling gold vein near the original Ortiz mine. The ore from this location, plus the rock from the Ortiz vein, overloaded the 15-stamp mill. Colonel Anderson left for the east in January 1869 to buy a new 25-stamp plant.[33]

He returned in April and began construction of a building to house the combined forty stamps. Under Anderson, the work force grew to include over forty miners and sixteen support/administrative personnel. Men were taken from the mining operation to install the new equipment, and production dropped drastically. It

was hoped to add another sixty tons per day to the mill's capacity and recover the lost revenue, but problems in setting up the stamps delayed the completion of the plant.

The events of 1869 cancelled out the promise shown in earlier years. After the treasury was emptied in doubling the mill's capacity, the ore shoots in the mine bottomed out at ground-water level. Because of the mistaken belief that the ore would continue to hold out, no exploration drifts had been pushed along the veins. Anderson was fired and replaced by W. C. Rencher, son of the former governor and editor of the Santa Fe *Democrat.* Under Rencher, the mill ran on ore taken from the sides and pillars of the old stopes. By June 1870 these few bits of ore had been processed and the mine went on standby status. Although it was leased several times in the succeeding years, the grant was never again to be operated on a profitable basis.

Although the faltering management of a mining operation by a newspaper editor who owed his position to nepotism may seem absurd, in view of the personalities and policies involved in the grant from the beginning, this situation approached the norm. With the exception of Michael Steck, those interested in the Ortiz mine were primarily occupied with other matters, other professions. The grant was a milch cow to be suitably drained, if possible, then abandoned for another of the opportunities that continually arose in territorial New Mexico for the fortunate men who enjoyed appointive office. These gentry faithfully emulated the New England missionaries described in James Michener's *Hawaii,* who came to the islands to do good and ended by doing very, very well.

NOTES

1. Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico* (facsimile edition, Albuquerque, 1962), p. 417. The text of the proclamation is reproduced as a footnote.

2. Frederick Adolphus Wislizenus, *Memoir of a Tour to Northern Mexico, Connected with Col. Doniphan's Expedition in 1846 and 1847,* U.S. Senate Miscellaneous Documents, Number 26, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 1847-1848, p. 31.

3. Josiah Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies* (Norman, 1954), pp. 118-20. There is still doubt as to the actual date of discovery. Gregg arrived some years later and depended on hearsay.

4. John M. Townley, "Mining in the Ortiz Mine Grant Area, Southern Santa Fe County, New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Nevada, 1968), pp. 51-53.

5. Otis E. Young, "The Spanish Tradition in Gold and Silver Mining," *Arizona and the West,* vol. 7 (1965), p. 304. This article thoroughly examines Spanish mining techniques and particularly describes the arrastra.

6. Philip St. George Cooke, *Conquest of New Mexico and California in 1846-1848* (reprint, Albuquerque, 1964).

7. J. W. Abert, *Report on His Examination of New Mexico in the Years 1846-1847,* U.S. Senate, Executive Document No. 23, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. Abert visited Dolores and several other active and inactive districts. Immediately following the occupation of Santa Fe the population of Dolores was 200.

8. Ralph P. Bieber, "Letters of William Carr Lane, 1852-1854," NMHR, vol. 3 (1928), pp. 181-89.

9. John Greiner (transcribed by Tod B. Galloway), "The Private Letters of A Government Official in the Southwest," *The Journal of American History,* ed. by Francis Trevelyan Miller, vol. 3 (1909), pp. 541-54.

10. Anon., *The New Mexico Mining Company: Preliminary Report for the Use of the Stockholders* (New York: Baker and Godwin, Printers, 1864), p. 6.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Lansing B. Bloom, "Historical Society Minutes, 1859-1863," NMHR, vol. 18 (1943), p. 421. Greiner applied for membership in the Society in 1859. He was inducted into the Santa Fe Masonic lodge in 1857; therefore his absence from New Mexico was between the years of 1854 and 1857. Upon his return, he had acquired the title of Major.

13. Charles E. Brooks and Frank D. Reeve, eds., "James A. Bennett: A Dragoon in New Mexico, 1850-1856," NMHR, vol. 22 (1947), pp. 167-68.

14. Anon., *The New Mexico Mining Company,* p. 17.

15. Waldemar Lindgren, et al., *The Ore Deposits of New Mexico,* U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 68 (Washington, D.C., 1910).

16. Charles H. Gildersleeve vs. New Mexico Mining Company, Court Record (Santa Fe, 1890), paragraphs 3539-3571. This volume is probably the best source of information on the legal machinations of the New Mexico Mining Company.

17. Bancroft, p. 648.

18. Willis T. Lee, *The Cerrillos Coal Field, Santa Fe County, New Mexico,* U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 531 (Washington, D.C., 1913), p. 286.

19. Rossiter W. Raymond, *Report on the Mineral Resources of the States and Territories West of the Rocky Mountains,* Executive Document No. 54, Report to the House of Representatives, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1869, pp. 404-18.

20. Anon., *Compilation of Facts Relative to the Mining Property Known as the San Pedro and Cañon del Agua Grants* (Washington, D.C., 1866), p. 20.

21. *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette,* July 23, 1864, p. 2.

22. R. E. Owen and E. T. Cox, *Report on the Mines of New Mexico* (Bloomington, Ind., 1865). "Dr. Owen was for nine years a Professor of Chemistry and Geology at Western Military Institute. He is now a Professor at Indiana State University and State Geologist of Indiana. Professor Cox has been State Geologist of both Kentucky and Arkansas." *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette,* Nov. 12, 1864, p. 2. The report was partially published in *ibid.,* Nov. 26, 1864, pp. 1-2. The remaining portions were printed in the Dec. 3, 1864, issue. Owen and Cox left for the east via the next coach.

23. *Ibid.,* April 8, 1865, p. 2. The *Gazette* endorsed the enterprise then and in the long series of proposals made to condemn public lands along the proposed right-of-way. Similar proposals were made frequently during the nineteenth century.

24. *Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican,* Feb. 11, 1868, p. 1.

25. William A. Keleher, *Turmoil in New Mexico* (Santa Fe, 1951), p. 434. Dr. Steck came to New Mexico in 1852 as an Indian Agent, working with John Greiner, who initially purchased the grant from Maraquita Montoya. He was very effective in his post and settled many long-standing conflicts between the Indians and other residents of the territory. He was ardently pro-Union and attempted to keep southern New Mexico loyal in

1860-61. Steck violently disagreed with the Indian policy of General James H. Carleton, commander of the Military Department of New Mexico. Believing that the General intended to kill any Indian male on sight, Steck brought the conflict to the press and published continuing articles condemning the policy. He finally resigned over the removal of the Navajo nation to the reservation of Bosque Redondo. *Ibid.*, p. 506, note 137.

26. *Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican,* May 25, 1866, p. 2.
27. *Ibid.,* April 6, 1866, p. 2; April 27, 1866, p. 2.
28. *Ibid.,* Oct. 6, 1866, p. 2.
29. *Mining and Scientific Press,* Feb. 9, 1867, p. 87.
30. *Santa Fe Weekly New Mexican,* June 8, 1867, p. 2.
31. *Ibid.,* Aug. 31, 1867, p. 2.
32. *Ibid.,* Aug. 4, 1868, p. 2.
33. *Ibid.,* Jan. 19, 1869, p. 2.

to be noted . . .

¶ NMHR is happy to note that a number of outstanding works of interest to its readers are again available:

The University of New Mexico Press offers *Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Otermín's Attempted Reconquest, 1680-1682.* Introduction and Annotations by Charles Wilson Hackett. Translations by Charmion Clair Shelby. *Coronado Cuarto Centennial Publications, 1540-1940,* vols. VIII and IX. VIII, pp. ccx, 262. IX, pp. xii, 430. Map, gloss., index. $40.00. A map has been added to orient the reader. Unfortunately the caption, "Principal places in New Mexico in 1680," is somewhat misleading. Laguna and Abiquiu, both post-Revolt pueblos are shown, while several pueblos which were in existence in 1680 are omitted.

A paperback edition of Roland F. Dickey's long out-of-print *New Mexico Village Arts* (Albuquerque: UNM Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 264. Illus., gloss., bibliog., index. $2.95) includes a new preface and an updated bibliography. This charming and informative work about the "ordinary men and women who worked with their hands to create a satisfying way of life" in New Mexico is as timely now as when it was first published in 1949. Although the original color illustrations by Lloyd Lózes Goff have been reduced and printed in black and white, the modest price makes the book accessible to a wider public.

The English translation of François Chevalier's *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda* (Translated by Alvin Eustis. Edited by Lesley Byrd Simpson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 334. Illus., bibliog., gloss., index. $3.25) has also been issued as a paperback. This classic study is indispensable to those interested in the evolution of Spanish colonial land acquisition and use.

John Leddy Phelan's erudite *The Millennial Kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Pp. x, 179. Bibliog., index. $6.75) has been extensively revised in the light of criticism of the first edition. See the review by Fray Angelico Chavez, NMHR, vol. 31 (1956), pp. 350-52.

Western America: The Exploration, Settlement, and Development of the Region beyond the Mississippi by Leroy R. Hafen, W. Eugene Hollon, and the late Carl Coke Rister (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. Pp. xviii, 584. Maps, tables, bibliogs., index. $10.95), long a standard text, has been thoroughly revised and modernized in this, the third edition.

In its continuing reprint series Da Capo Press has revived Thomas Maitland Marshall's diplomatic study *A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841* (New York, 1970. Pp. xviii, 267. Maps, bibliog., index. $15.00), originally published in 1914 as Vol. II of the *University of California Publications in History*.

¶ New from the University of Oklahoma Press is Manfred R. Wolfenstine's *The Manual of Brands and Marks*. Edited by Ramon F. Adams. Norman, 1970. Pp. xxx, 434. Illus., gloss., bibliog., index. $9.95. An extremely useful reference tool, the book includes a history of brands and branding and sections on implements, methods, design, types of brands and marks, and registration. Seventy-four pages of plates and figures complement the text.

¶ Number 13 in the *Anthropological Papers of the University of Arizona,* William B. Griffen's *Cultural Change and Shifting Populations in Central Northern Mexico* (Tucson, 1969. Pp. xii, 196. Maps, apps., bibliog. $6.00) deals with relations between Spanish colonists and various groups of raiding Indians down the camino real from New Mexico. The study is solidly based on Mexican archival material, particularly from the Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral.

¶ Under the editorship of Albert H. Schroeder, *La Gaceta: El Boletín del Corral de Santa Fe Westerners* has reappeared with Vol. V, No. 1 (1970) featuring "Horse Race at Fort Fauntleroy: An Incident of the Navajo Wars" by Marc Simmons.

¶ *Southwest 1880 with Ben Wittick, Pioneer Photographer of Indian and Frontier Life* by Gar and Maggy Packard (Santa Fe: Packard Publications, 1970. Pp. 47. Paper $3.50) is a handsome production, with eighty-nine historic Wittick photographs of Southwestern subjects from the collection of the Museum of New Mexico.

¶ *Faith to Move Mountains: A History of the Colorado District of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod from the earliest mission work, 1872-1968* (Denver, 1969. Pp. xii, 233. Illus., maps, apps., bibliog., index. $4.95) is a

commemorative study tracing Lutheran activities in Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah; El Paso County, Texas; and the Navajo Reservation.

¶ For the second time in three years Richard E. Greenleaf has won honorable mention from the Conference on Latin American History of the American Historical Association for an article published in NMHR, on this occasion, "The Inquisition and the Masonic Movement: 1751-1820" which appeared in April 1969.

¶ When Professor Frank D. Reeve, editor of NMHR from 1946 until 1964, died on the last day of 1967, he left several nearly finished manuscripts. Thanks to Alice Ann Cleaveland, an Albuquerque teacher, one of them, a text for junior high school students, has recently been published. *New Mexico: Land of Many Cultures* (Boulder: Pruett Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 248. Maps, illus., apps., bibliog., index. Cloth $5.95. Paper $3.50) puts the emphasis on the colonial and territorial periods and provides an excellent historical introduction to the state's fascinating past.

EBA JLK

HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW. Back issues are priced at $5 per volume or $1.25 per issue, except for issues in short supply at $3 each. At present, most volumes are in print, except for 1926-27 and 1946-48. Comprehensive indexes of Vols. 1-15 (1926-40) and Vols. 16-30 (1941-55) are available at $3 each. Volumes out of print may be obtained from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

OLD SANTA FE. Published quarterly, 1913-16. The following issues are available: Vol. I, Nos., 1, 2, 3, at $1 each. Vol. III, No. 12, at $3.

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO PAPERS

Journal of New Mexico Convention Delegates to Recommend a Plan of Civil Government, September, 1849. 22 pp. No. 10, 1907. $3.00

In Memory of L. Bradford Prince, President of the Society, by Frank W. Clancy. 15 pp. No. 25, 1923, $1.00

Early Vaccination in New Mexico, by Lansing B. Bloom, 12 pp. No. 27, 1924. $3.00

Colonel José Francisco Chaves 1833-1924, by Paul A. F. Walter, Frank W. Clancy, and M. A. Otero. 18 pp., illus. No. 31, 1926. English edition, $2.00. Spanish edition (1927), $2.00

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORY

Albert Franklin Banta: Arizona Pioneer, edited by Frank D. Reeve. 149 pp., illus., index. Vol. XIV, Sept. 1953. $2.50

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

St. Francis and Franciscans in New Mexico, by Theodosius Meyer. 40 pp., illus., 1926. $2.50

New Mexico, Dancing-ground of the Sun: A Brief Introduction to the State. 38 pp., illus. 1954. $0.50

REPRINTS FROM NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

"Music Teaching in New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," by Lota M. Spell. 12 pp., Vol. 2 (1927). $3.00

"Military Escorts on the Santa Fe Trail," by Fred S. Perrine (Conclusion only). 36 pp., Vol. 3 (1928). $0.50

"Uses of Wood by the Spanish Colonists in New Mexico," by Hester Jones. 27 pp., Vol. 7 (1932). $1.00

"Kin and Clan," by A. F. Bandelier, 11 pp., Vol. 8 (1933). $1.00

"The Spanish Military Chapels in Santa Fe and the Reredos of Our Lady of Light," by A. von Wuthenau. 20 pp., Vol. 10 (1935). $1.00

"Who Discovered New Mexico?" by Lansing B. Bloom, 32 pp., Vol. 15 (1940). $2.00

"The Coronado-Bocanegra Family Alliance," by Lansing B. Bloom. 31 pp., Vol. 16 (1941). $3.00

ADDRESS ORDERS TO
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO PRESS
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87106

Book Reviews

IN PURSUIT OF AMERICAN HISTORY. RESEARCH AND TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES. By Walter Rundell, Jr., with foreword by James B. Rhoads. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 1970. Bibliog., index. Pp. xvi, 445. $7.95.

THIS REPORT which evaluates the training of professional historians in the United States is a valuable contribution to the field. Based largely on 557 interviews at 112 institutions and supplemented by questionnaire data from other universities, libraries, historical societies, public and private archives, the study is an excellent resource document for university history departments that wish to modernize programs and for those who want to re-evaluate training programs of graduate students in historical method. A lengthy chapter on "the methods course," the Ranke tradition, and the need of training young scholars in historical criticism should be read by all professors and by their doctoral candidates. In some cases the classical methods course has been a failure according to those interviewed, but many others feel that lack of instruction in historical method has been a crucial gap in their preparation.

This volume is not a manual for graduate training but rather a suggestive study of how graduate education in history should be organized. Chapters on Social Science tools for the historian, location of source materials, new techniques for collecting and reproduction of data, documentary editing and researcher-custodian relations give a well-rounded explanation of how the historian functions and what his professional needs are. Theory of history and philosophy of history are not treated in any depth by the report.

Tulane University RICHARD E. GREENLEAF

HISTORY AS HIGH ADVENTURE. By Walter Prescott Webb. Edited with an introduction by E. C. Barksdale. Austin: The Pemberton Press, 1969. Pp. xvii, 206. Index. $6.95.

THIS COLLECTION of addresses by Walter Prescott Webb appears, as described on the title page, as a "Publication of the Jenkins Garrett Foundation by the Pemberton Press." In an "Introduction to the Series" the Foundation (whose name appears at the bottom, as author of the Introduction)

refers to a plan to publish "documents and other material in the Foundation's library [not otherwise described] that have never been published or whose publication is not readily available outside the larger libraries" (p. v). According to the editor, Professor E. C. Barksdale of the University of Texas at Arlington, a student of Webb, "Generally . . . the 'pieces' [published here] are found in typewritten or mimeographed form only, or have appeared in publications of limited circulation, mostly are out of print" (p. x). There is no identification of each selection with it or in the table of contents, or in the footnotes collected at the back of the book (apparently Webb's original footnotes, excepting those that go with the editor's "Explanation"). But the editor says that the first selection appeared as an editorial in the *Junior Historian,* and he identifies the second and seventh selections as Webb's presidential addresses before the American Historical Association (1958) and the Mississippi Valley Historical Association (1955, though cited here as 1953) and the fifth as a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers in 1960; in a footnote, he says that "Hypothesis in History" (apparently the same as "Hypothesis and History," the fourteenth selection) is an undated mimeographed typescript. By internal evidence one can tentatively date the third selection at 1953, the fourth at 1954, the sixth at 1959 or later, the eighth at 1956, the ninth at 1957, the tenth at about 1950, the eleventh at 1954 or 1955, the twelfth at 1958, the thirteenth at 1961, the fourteenth at 1953 or later, the fifteenth at 1961 or later. A Texan might date some more precisely, as by noting when the Texas State Teachers Association met at Houston and San Marcos; he might even know the library of the Jenkins Garrett Foundation, on which I was able to find no information other than the address of a lawyer in Fort Worth. It would have been pleasant and might have been useful to have such information and other information, including (since there are enough minor typographical errors to weaken confidence in the texts as they stand) any places of previous publication and, for that matter, republication, as in *An Honest Preface and Other Essays,* edited by Joe B. Frantz (1959), which includes three of the selections presented here.

Webb was always a pleasure to listen to, and he is a pleasure to read, even when what he wrote was meant for listening rather than reading. He repeated himself, on purpose, and he did it very well. The ideas that he repeated were worth repeating, both because they were significant, thought-provoking ideas and because they were ideas around which Webb had organized much of his thinking and teaching. When Webb appeared before a group of physicists, or geographers, or writers (selection nine), or schoolteachers (selections ten and twelve), it was fitting that he should give them a representative sample of Webb rather than something that might have

fitted more neatly into their program but would have given them less of an idea of how a historian—or at least that historian—worked. His concern for teaching, and his determination to live the life of historian as man thinking about the past (and illuminating it for others), rather than as man accumulating information about the past, make some of these articles seem more timely now, when teachers are recalling—some of them under pressure—that they are hired essentially to teach, than in the past when some of us forgot that colleges can subsidize research for the most part only as an aid to teaching. His theory of the Great Frontier may appeal to the ecology-minded generation of the 1970's more than it has appealed to economic historians.

University of Oregon EARL POMEROY

IN THE DAYS OF VICTORIO: RECOLLECTIONS OF A WARM SPRINGS APACHE. By Eve Ball. James Kaywaykla, narrator. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970. Pp. xvi, 222. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. $6.50.

AS IS TRUE of most of the Indian wars, accounts of the Victorio campaign have been based on the reports of Indian agents, army officers, and other white men because the Indian viewpoint has not been available. However, the publication of the recollections of James Kaywaykla, a Warm Springs Apache and a member of Victorio's band, will bring some balance to our knowledge of the Warm Springs chief and his people. Certainly Kaywaykla's portraits of Victorio, Nana and other Apache leaders are radically different from those that appeared in New Mexico newspapers in the 1870's and 1880's.

James Kaywaykla was a nephew of Victorio and a grandson of Nana, and his childhood consisted of flight and warfare. Until he was ten years of age, he said, he did not know that people died except by violence. He survived the massacre at Tres Castillos and was acquainted with Geronimo, Juh, Chihuahua, Chato, Naiche and other famous warriors, and in 1886 he was sent to Florida with the other Apache prisoners and eventually was enrolled in Carlisle Institute. His viewpoint is that of an Apache patriot. His story is that of an oppressed people fighting for their freedom from a government known to them for treachery (as in the murder of Mangas Coloradas) and for broken promises. The Warm Springs Apache could not understand how the United States could give them a reservation at their beloved Cañada Alamosa and then take it away from them and order them to the San Carlos Reservation in Arizona. They were familiar with San Carlos and suspected that the government hoped that they would die there

from heat and disease, and they were bewildered when army scouts and non-combatants on the reservation were imprisoned in Florida with the hostiles in 1886.

Kaywaykla's account demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses of oral history. He was only eight or nine years old when he was sent to Carlisle, and although he was present during many of these events, he learned his history from the tribal elders and from participants in the campaigns. His story, which is something of an official history of the Warm Springs Apache, is based on oral traditions which undoubtedly were modified with endless retelling. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are minor inaccuracies and that occasionally his story does not agree with the written record. Nor is it surprising that it does not always agree with the recollections of another Apache, Jason Betzinez, in *I Fought with Geronimo*. In addition, Kaywaykla was familiar with the white men's accounts of this period, and it is impossible to judge whether he was influenced by what he read.

Oral history can be an invaluable tool for scholars, but must be used with care. In publications such as this, the editor is faced with a difficult task, for the oral tradition must be carefully evaluated and compared with other sources. It is regrettable, therefore, that the annotation is so slight. Kaywaykla's colorful and often dramatic account, which is essential for a balanced picture of the Warm Springs Apache, stands largely on its own merits.

University of New Mexico RICHARD N. ELLIS

CHASING GERONIMO: THE JOURNAL OF LEONARD WOOD, MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1886. Edited, with Introduction and Epilogue by Jack C. Lane. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 152. Illus., map, bibliog., index. $6.95.

LEONARD WOOD cut a colorful swath in American military history. Born in New Hampshire in 1860, he graduated from Harvard Medical School and entered the Army as an assistant contract surgeon in 1886 and was assigned to Arizona Territory. There he joined the troops chasing Geronimo in the field, after which he did duty at various posts. Then in 1895 he was transferred to Washington, D.C., where he numbered President and Mrs. William McKinley among his patients. Still only a captain in 1898 at the outbreak of the war with Spain, he teamed with Theodore Roosevelt to found the Rough Riders with himself as colonel and Roosevelt the lieutenant colonel. After the war he became the military governor of Cuba with the rank of major general of volunteers, and in 1903 he was transferred to the Philippines in an administrative capacity. That same year he was promoted

to major general in the regular Army, and in 1910 became chief of staff for four years. During World War I he hoped to command the American Expeditionary Force, but the office went to John J. Pershing, much to Wood's chagrin. In 1920 he sought the Republican nomination for the presidency only to fail, but Warren G. Harding named him governor-general of the Philippines, an office he held until 1927, the year of his death.

This book contains Wood's edited journal for that first campaign, the Geronimo outbreak of 1886, yet is a curiously biased account. The Geronimo campaign involved more than chasing thirty-nine renegades in the mountains of Sonora; it pitted the Indian-fighting philosophy of General George Crook against that of General Nelson A. Miles—and Wood came down squarely on the side of the winner, Miles. Crook believed in pressuring the Indians militarily until they negotiated a settlement, while Miles wanted military pressure that resulted in unconditional surrender. Thus when Miles assumed command of the Department of Arizona on April 11, 1886 (not "in May 1886" as the editor states, p. 9), he ordered an elite force to take the field against the renegades led by Geronimo. Captain Henry W. Lawton commanded this detachment, with Leonard Wood accompanying it as surgeon.

Three futile months of pursuit never brought this detachment into contact with the Indians; in fact, by mid-August of 1886 Lawton had no idea where the Indians were. Miles, in fear that Geronimo might surrender to the Mexicans, thereby robbing him of the glory and possible promotion he would achieve as the Apache conqueror, turned to Crook's methods by sending Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood to negotiate with Geronimo. Gatewood found the Apaches, secured their surrender, and brought them out of Mexico to meet Miles. On the morning of August 26, 1886, after Geronimo surrendered to him, Gatewood introduced the Apache war chief to Lawton and Wood, the first time they ever had met him. After the surrender and the shabby internment of the Apaches that saw them held prisoners of war for twenty-seven years, Miles could not admit he had secured their surrender by diplomacy, for that would be to admit the efficacy of Crook's methods. Thus Lawton was twice promoted within three years, an astonishing rise at that time, while Gatewood was given nothing but obscurity.

Leonard Wood's participation in this campaign was much beyond the call of duty for an assistant contract surgeon. However, he and Lawton were not the only two men to serve during that entire summer of chasing Geronimo, as Lane states in his introduction (p. 19); another participant, Lieutenant H. C. Benson, wrote, "I was present during the entire time," a comment verified by dispatches from the field. Moreover, Benson commented, "there were at least forty enlisted men who were with the com-

mand from start to finish." Benson also pointed out other lies in Lawton's report of the expedition: there was no scarcity of water, they were never without supplies, no soldiers ever became so exhausted as to be ordered back to the barracks, there was only one fight with the Indians, that by only a portion of the troops (Troop B of the 4th Cavalry) at which place Leonard Wood was not present, and Leonard Wood never heard a shot fired in anger. Editor Lane has swallowed whole the Miles' side of this controversy; he either did not search out the other side of the controversy or else chose to ignore facts that contraverted Miles' version. In fact, he does not note that Wood was White House Surgeon to President McKinley when he received the Medal of Honor for the campaign, while Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood, the man who took the risks and who secured Geronimo's surrender, was refused a medal for his contributions on the grounds that he never had actually come under fire. Finally, Lane exposes his anti-Indian biases by describing the Apaches in terms of "plunder and destruction," "revengeful hostile," and "savagery" (p. 6), while discussing "the notorious Geronimo" as "the wily Indian and his band" (p. 4).

However, *Chasing Geronimo* is a valuable book despite the prejudices of the editor and the biases of Leonard Wood. It contains a graphic account of the difficulties encountered by troops in the field, and—in a way Wood never intended—it shows the lengths to which a heroic band of Indians went to preserve their independence and tribal integrity. The University of New Mexico Press has produced a fine example of the book-maker's art; the design is attractive, the price is modest, and the illustrations are excellent.

Oklahoma State University ODIE B. FAULK

THE LOST TRAPPERS. By David H. Coyner. Edited and with an Introduction by David J. Weber. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970. Pp. xl, 188. Map, index. $8.50.

IN 1847 David H. Coyner, an ex-Presbyterian minister, became both an author and an authority. The book that he wrote recounted the adventures of Ezekiel Williams and his band of trappers in the Rocky Mountain West between 1807 and 1810. According to Coyner, Williams and twenty followers went up the Missouri in 1807 to return Chief Big White of the Mandans to his people. Big White had accompanied Lewis and Clark back to the States a year earlier to meet with the "Great White Father" in Washington. After reaching the Mandan village, Williams and his men continued on to the Yellowstone, then moved south along the Rockies, where they encountered a series of mishaps with hostiles. Only Williams, James Workman, and Samuel Spencer lived to reach the Arkansas. There the party

separated, Williams setting out for Missouri and Workman and Spencer heading for Santa Fe. Although captured and held prisoner by the Kansas Indians for a time, Williams was able to reach his intended destination in 1809. The other two trappers became lost and eventually ended up spending the winter in California, finally reaching Santa Fe in 1810 where they remained for fifteen years before returning home.

When the book was first published, readers accepted it as fact, but by the turn of the century enough was known about the actual happenings of the period to enable Elliot Coues to state in 1898 that *The Lost Trappers* was "an apocryphal book, never materializing out of fable-land into historical environment," and Hiram Chittenden in 1902 to suggest that "the author, Coyner, was chiefly a coiner of lies." As in so many things, however, the truth lay somewhere in between. Although Coyner was a Virginian who had traveled only as far west as Missouri (where he apparently lived in 1845-1847), he had talked to men who had trapped in the Rockies and lived in Oregon and California. And there is no doubt that Ezekiel Williams was an authentic mountain man who had experienced many of the adventures described in the book, although the dates and particular circumstances were often garbled. Modern scholars have established that Williams may have gone up the Missouri as early as 1809, not, however, as the leader of the party that provided an escort for Big White, but as one of its members. The expedition, which actually numbered three hundred and fifty, was led by Manuel Lisa. Workman and Spencer turn out to be purely fictitious characters, but their adventures are based on the experiences of real-life trappers. Seen in perspective, then, the book is a curious one, often valid in its generalities but often invalid in specificity. It is the kind of book that does not lend itself to citation but is full of insight. Coyner may indeed have written one of the first nonfiction novels.

David J. Weber has done an excellent job of separating fact from fiction in his introduction to the present volume. His essay also traces the evolution of the discovery that Coyner was highly imaginative, and includes new biographical data on the controversial author and his dramatis personae. Footnotes to the text indicate many of the written sources Coyner used in its preparation and prove that the author was not only an avid reader of his contemporaries, particularly Washington Irving, but that he appreciated them so much he often copied them exactly.

Perhaps the greatest contribution an author can make to the civilization in which he lives is to stimulate discussion and challenge others to research his subject. One of the few statements one can safely make about David Coyner is that he made a contribution.

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation JOHN D. MCDERMOTT

MISSION OF SORROWS: JESUIT GUEVAVI AND THE PIMAS, 1691-1767. By John L. Kessell, with a Foreword by Ernest J. Burrus, S.J. University of Arizona Press: Tucson, 1970. Illus., bibliog., index. Pp. xvi, 224. $10.00.

IN this well-written, authoritative book John L. Kessell has provided Borderlands historical literature with its first in-depth study of a Jesuit Arizona missionary center: Los Santos Ángeles de Guevavi. As Ernest J. Burrus, S. J. states in his foreword to the book "the story of Guevavi does not represent constant progress, much less an uninterrupted series of triumphant victories over ignorance and poverty. The difficulties to be overcome were staggeringly discouraging, as the reader soon learns: indifferent or hostile natives, unjust and oppressive colonists, marauding savages."

There is no doubt that Kessell's study will become a model for other sound research and, hopefully, good writing on individual missions and their environs in colonial Arizona and New Mexico. He has provided a wealth of interesting data and interpretation based upon meticulous archival research. The account relies upon Guevavi and Tumacácori papers in Archives of the Roman Catholic Diocese in Tucson, Audiencia of Guadalajara and Contratación manuscripts in Sevilla, the ramos of Historia, Misiones, and Temporalidades in the Mexican National Archives; and a host of other documentary collections in the United States, Mexico, and Spain.

The University of Arizona Press has issued Kessell's work in a handsome volume. An excellent mission map of "The Northern Pimería Alta 1691-1767," photographs and facsimile reproductions of Jesuit holographs enhance the work. Kessell's appendices "The Jesuits of Guevavi" and his "Inventory of the Properties of the Church, House and Fields of Guevavi" undergird this important study.

Tulane University RICHARD E. GREENLEAF

ARIZONA TERRITORY, 1863-1912: A POLITICAL HISTORY. By Jay J. Wagoner. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 587. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. $12.00.

STUDENTS of Western America have witnessed a renewed interest in territorial history during the past decade. A field almost abandoned after the publication of Earl Pomeroy's classic study gained new prominence with the completion of Howard Lamar's major study and the more limited contributions of Lewis Gould, Calvin Horn, Robert Larson, and others. Jay J. Wagoner's *Arizona Territory* is, however, the first full-length study of territorial government in the Southwest. Providing much more detail than Lamar could have in his *Far Southwest*, Wagoner has made a major contribution to the study of frontier politics.

This massive volume approaches Arizona government through the administrations of sixteen men who served as territorial executives. Defeated Congressmen, friends of influential politicians, and deserving bureaucrats received appointments in the desert territory. All of the early appointees were easterners who knew little about the area or its problems. Later governors tended to be more familiar with Arizona, although many still showed a greater interest in personal remuneration than public service. In an era when the fortunes of the Democratic Party were at a low ebb, all but two administrations were Republican.

An essential contradiction in the theory of territorial government is evident from Wagoner's study. On the one hand, federal appointees sent into the West were expected to teach the residents of the area the fine art of self-government. Not until these lessons had been fully learned would they be admitted to statehood. But at the same time, few governors were sufficiently well-informed about current conditions, and political machinations, or the policies of their predecessors, to make meaningful contributions. Good intentions and political experience in the east could not compensate for ignorance about the territory. By the time an executive learned his way around, a change in Washington administrations or receipt of a barrage of letters from his opponents led to the removal of the governor and the selection of another equally uninformed politician for the post.

As a result of these persistent problems, one may question whether territorial politics can best be observed through the office of the governor. While one executive followed another in rapid succession, the most significant political activities in Arizona occurred not in the executive offices but in the legislature, where representatives of special interests such as mining and railroads saw to it that needed laws were enacted. These same groups continued to control Arizona long after it achieved statehood. Similarly, the territorial courts developed legal precedents which reflected the special situation in the area, especially regarding water rights and irrigation controversies. The emergence of political parties and regional factions also contributed in an important way to the maturation of Arizona politics. Because the instructional aspect of territorial government evidently failed to work in Arizona and most governors were rather weak, it is unfortunate that Wagoner chose to devote so much attention to the personalities and policies of the executives that he relegated other political activities to minor positions.

Other weaknesses in this study make it something less than a perfect model for other territorial studies. The author somewhat naively used the appointment papers in the National Archives without evaluating who wrote the letters or why. Accepting the judgments expressed in this correspondence at face value is questionable. Greater use of the massive files

of correspondence in the State and Interior department archives as well as the many theses and dissertations written on Arizona politics could have added depth to the study. Moreover, the author seems to have been reluctant to draw conclusions or undertake the kind of analysis which has made Lamar's book so important. Too often he lists an act passed by a legislature or paraphrases the messages of a governor without examining their significance to the development of the territory. Readers may have difficulty in determining which executives Wagoner considered the most effective and which the least.

The University of Arizona Press deserves special praise for the excellent design of the volume. The insertions of illustrations at appropriate points in the text rather than in a single photograph section is a good practice which other publishers might well adopt. It is similarly refreshing to find footnotes at the bottom of the page. Lengthy appendices listing territorial officials and members of the assemblies further add to the reference value of this important book. Hopefully its successes will stimulate some New Mexico historian to undertake a similar project for Arizona's neighbor to the east.

Western Illinois University LAWRENCE R. MURPHY

THE ESPUELA LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY: A STUDY OF A FOREIGN-OWNED RANCH IN TEXAS. By William Curry Holden, with foreword by Joe B. Frantz. Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1970. Pp. xxii, 268. Illus., maps, index. $9.00.

THIRTY-SIX years ago, William C. Holden published *The Spur Ranch,* a detailed operational history of the Espuela Land and Cattle Company, Limited, a British firm which between 1885 and 1907 ran a spread of half a million acres lying just beyond the Caprock escarpment on the High Plains east of Lubbock. Based almost entirely on the records of the Spur Ranch in the Southwest Collection at Texas Technological College, that book focused topically on various aspects of cattle ranching as seen through the eyes of various managers of this particular enterprise, and included chapters on the genesis of the Spur, its Texas management, a variety of problems connected with cattle sales, horses, drought, water, fencing, and the natural enemies of livestock, not to mention ranch neighbors, hired hands and their work routines and amusements. It was a solid work, an excellent portrayal of the mechanics of cattle ranching.

The Espuela Land and Cattle Company is the 1934 study, its basic corpus unchanged, to which a number of chapters have been added. Brief but new introductory sections now describe the land, the flora and fauna,

and the history of the region before 1885. A new chapter describes the problem of buying out nesters settled on school sections blocked within range land owned by the ranch; others are concerned with cattle rustling, the ranch's experiments with agriculture, and its controversies with other parties. Chapters of the original work are changed only slightly or not at all. Nor are the sources broadened appreciably to work in the vast literature of recent years, except in the introductory chapters before the British company took over. The Spur Ranch records remain the chief source of information—an excellent source, to be sure, but one-dimensional. All Spur correspondence is outgoing, written by devoted company servants. One wonders if the chapter on "Controversies"—the ranch's disputes, legal and otherwise—for example, would have the same slant if newspapers, court records, and outside correspondence had been used to augment the Spur materials.

A dozen photographs and several appendices add interest, but the book is marred by excessive and overlong quotes, not to mention a prose style which is at times repetitious and awkward. The book badly needs a map to give the Spur Ranch some relationship with its general setting, and after more than three and a half decades, Ogallala should be properly located in Nebraska, rather than Montana (pp. 143, 144). It is disappointing that this revision has not broadened the context. Still lacking is any analysis of the corporate side of the enterprise. Who were the stockholders? What was the capital of the company, nominal and actual? Were there reorganizations to raise additional funds, when the ranch lost money? Were the problems of the Espuela similar to those described in W. Turrentine Jackson's admirable *The Enterprising Scot*? How would the concern fit into the framework of the western cattle industry as depicted in Gene Gressley's *Bankers and Cattlemen*? Unfortunately, *The Espuela Land and Cattle Company* does not take advantage of the work of these and other recent scholars and a book that is basically sound remains dated.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign CLARK C. SPENCE

PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN CALIFORNIA. By Stephen J. Field. New York: Da Capo Press, 1968. Pp. vi, 406. $14.50.

STEPHEN J. FIELD, prior to his elevation to U.S. Supreme Court Justice, had ample opportunity to view American California. Arriving in San Francisco late in 1849, he was soon in the placers, making his headquarters at Marysville on the Feather River. There he entered business, practiced law, and was elected by a nine-vote margin to the position of alcalde, a hispanic institutional holdover into the military occupation period. Sub-

sequent public service took the transplanted New Yorker to the state legislature and the state supreme court. As is customary in reminiscences, Field's participation was crucial and he was unfailingly on the side of right. As the acknowledged center of frequent controversy, it is not surprising that his views were frequently accepted. It would have been unlikely had a man of his later distinction suffered many rebuffs, and doubly so had he told of them.

The first half of the book was written in 1877, many years after most of the events transpired. At the request of his friends, Field was giving his account of personal participation. His story is buttressed by copious, well-selected documentation presented as exhibits in support of his "proposed findings of fact," to wit, that he had played a significant and unique role as a builder of California. It is a tale seasoned by pardonable pride and marinated by frequent retelling.

A second section, written by a judicial associate, George C. Gorham, recounts the story of an attempt on the life of the aging jurist. This 1889 attempt was motivated by charges of prejudice in a case involving inheritance by Miss Sarah Hill of the estate of Comstock tycoon and Nevada Senator William Sharon, her alleged husband. Miss Hill subsequently married the hot-tempered David S. Terry, erstwhile Chief Justice of California and slayer of U.S. Senator David C. Broderick. From his federal bench Field had rendered an adverse decision. This subsequently resulted in an attempt on the jurist's life by Terry, an act which caused the shooting of the would-be assassin by an alert federal marshal.

This book, written for a different audience, seems at times too unsophisticated. The modern reader may find the price of this expensive facsimile reprint too great for the quality of the edition or the value of the story.

The University of New Mexico DONALD C. CUTTER

RECONSTRUCTING PREHISTORIC PUEBLO SOCIETIES. Ed. by William A. Longacre. School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series, Douglas W. Schwartz, Gen. Ed. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 247. Illus., bibliog., index. $8.50.

A RECENT TREND in Southwestern archaeology has been to offer bold inferences and hypotheses regarding prehistoric social organization. This contrasts with forty or fifty years of avoidance of such speculations and concentration on distribution of material traits in space and time. The papers in this volume exemplify well this development. Six were given at a School of American Research seminar in Santa Fe in April 1968 and have been revised for publication; three others comment on these. There is particular

emphasis on the matters of research design and testing of hypotheses. The intention is to achieve anthropological study of cultural processes, in the hope of discovering regularities and formulating laws of cultural dynamics. Along with this anthropological approach there is also greater emphasis on ecology.

The first paper is a brief historical review by Longacre of trends in Southwestern archaeology. The second is "Prehistoric social organization in the American Southwest: theory and method," by James N. Hill, and is concerned with the questions that should be asked and the kinds of evidence that might be sought, with formulation of testable hypotheses.

Next, a paper by R. Gwinn Vivian, "An inquiry into prehistoric social organization in Chaco Canyon, New Mexico," combines a general summary of Chaco sites and a description of the prehistoric water-control systems with a hypothesis as to social organization and a list of items which might be found to support it.

A paper by William D. Lipe on "Anasazi communities in the Red Rock Plateau, southeastern Utah" summarizes, after describing the area, four successive prehistoric occupations (separated by time gaps), discussing settlement patterns and ecological aspects of each and probable reasons for each withdrawal. Lipe concludes, among other things, that "something resembling, in size and probably in composition, the modern western Pueblo extended-family-based household" was normal throughout.

Jeffrey S. Dean's paper is on "Aspects of Tsegi phase social organization: a trial reconstruction." It is concerned primarily with the great cliff-dwellings of 1250-1300, Betatakin and Keet Seel, of which Dean has made intensive dendrochronological studies. The environmental setting is described and the cultural-historical background is summarized. Settlement patterns are discussed, with room clusters the basic units of site communities. Dean has determined that Betatakin developed gradually between 1267 and 1286, but was founded originally by a single organized group. Keet Seel, however, grew by accretion from around 1250 until 1286. There is no indication that a single functioning community, already organized as a social unit, moved in as at Betatakin. The basic unit for the people of the Tsegi phase appears to have been the household of extended family type; Dean suggests that clans may have been present, and that kiva societies might also have been.

The sixth paper is "The postmigration culture: a base for archaeological inference," by Douglas W. Schwartz. It reviews various aspects of known migrations in the ethnographic literature, finding a number of cultural regularities of change, and then attempts to apply these to a Southwestern population shift observed archaeologically in the Grand Canyon area.

The first of the papers commenting on the seminar is by Paul S. Martin, "Explanation as an afterthought and as a goal," and includes a little general discussion as well as comments (favorable) on the preceding six papers. Most of the young men who have initiated the new approach in Southwestern archaeology are former students in Martin's field school at Vernon, Arizona.

A contribution by Edward P. Dozier, "Making inferences from the present to the past," offers insights from the standpoint of an ethnologist, including several cautions, and also summarizes Pueblo social organization concisely, together with a statement regarding sources of information.

Finally, there is a paper by another ethnologist, David F. Aberle, headed simply "Comments." Agreeing heartily with the general approach, Aberle criticizes the use of the word "theory" to mean "hypothesis" or "assumption," and points out the inevitable dependence of the archaeologist on the ethnographic record. He discusses in some detail the question of clans like those of the modern Hopi in the Tsegi phase, and questions the applicability of the generalizations regarding migrations to a Southwestern case.

Essential for the specialist, this book will be stimulating and revealing for anyone genuinely interested in Pueblo Indians and Southwestern archaeology.

Southern Methodist University ERIK K. REED

MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS OF MOENKOPI PUEBLO. By Shuichi Nagata. Illinois Studies in Anthropology, Number 6, with Foreword by Fred Eggan. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1970. Bibliog., maps, illus., index. Pp. xviii, 336. $10.95.

INTERDISCIPLINARY studies between the social sciences and history have become increasingly common. Indeed, anthropologists have formally recognized two interdisciplinary subfields, ethnohistory and historic archaeology, which specialize in such studies. The length of time covered by ethnographic research alone now makes it possible for the modern ethnologist to introduce historical perspective into his work that was unattainable by his predecessors utilizing only ethnographic data, discrediting the rather sterile concept of the "ethnographic present" and encouraging the use of historical documentation as well. Professor Nagata's book is not billed as "ethnohistory," but it is as ably handled as ethnohistory as it is as ethnology. In particular his reliance on the old agency letterbooks has helped him produce a report that will be of interest to historians as well as anthropologists. The

knowledge of Moenkopi and of the Hopis generally that he gained through his field work contributed materially to his interpretation of the historical data.

With a firm control of the cultural and historical variables, he has described in fine detail the changes through time at the Hopi village of Moenkopi from 1875 to 1962. Within this short span the village has progressed from a seasonally occupied farming settlement to a colony or "daughter" village of Old Oraibi to a nearly independent Hopi pueblo to a suburb of Tuba City. The most significant change has been a process of modernization influenced by geographic, economic, and political factors, but these in turn have caused profound changes in demography, social organization, and religion. Many of the changes are comparable to transformations by modernization of societies in other parts of the world, for example, the domination of the economy by money obtained primarily through wage work and the decline of the traditional social structure, here clan and lineage, with increasing importance of the nuclear family. Those who would make hasty value judgments should beware, for the Moenkopi people are far from participating in the culture of poverty as a cost of their progress, and the new family structure is less conducive to divorce than was the old. Moenkopi enjoys many of the advantages of the modern world while remaining uniquely Hopi. A careful reading of the book further reveals that a good deal of the credit for this happy situation can be given to the much maligned Federal programs for administering Indian affairs.

The progress made in modernization has not been without costs. The outward-looking village has lost much of its local community spirit. It remains so deeply divided by factionalism that it is in effect two villages, anti-council, traditional Lower Moenkopi and pro-council, progressive Upper Moenkopi. This same factional split is to be found throughout the Hopi country, however. Integration into the national economy has brought problems of indebtedness along with cars and refrigerators, while the trust status of the land has limited access to capital for more ambitious types of investment. Actions by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Hopi Tribal Council on behalf of the people of Moenkopi have sometimes strained relations with their Navajo neighbors, and the Navajo Tribal Council also has made decisions that affected the Moenkopi people without considering their views. While continuing economic progress and population growth seem assured, the unresolved political problem of defining Navajo and Hopi rights within the area remains a major issue that becomes more critical as the years pass, particularly with increasing transfer of power to the tribes. In the long run, the ability of the two tribes to settle the matter between them may well be the answer, providing that power should ever be delegated to them. An equitable solution that will be really binding is not likely until the

conflicting claims of the Hopi Tribal Council and the traditional chiefs are settled. Perhaps these can only be accomodated within a single functioning system by turning the contending parties loose to work the matter out themselves. A need to reach agreement with the Navajos might well supply the motivation, for the anti-council faction has long enjoyed a rapport with the Navajos that the Council has lacked. Nagata suggests no solutions himself, but clarifies the Hopi view of the problem in a manner that may contribute to its eventual resolution.

Nagata, with the thoroughness for which Japanese anthropologists are noted, has accumulated and organized data that elucidate many of the processes of modernization, as well as presenting information of value to students, administrators, and others interested in local matters. Detailed as his research has been, completeness inevitably diminishes as temporal, spatial, and cultural distance increases. At the risk of quibbling I will cite two examples. The Hopi dry farms in the area called the *nahaaldzis* or "hollow" by the Navajos (I do not know the Hopi name) about seven miles southeast of Moenkopi were not mentioned in the section on agriculture. They may well have lain fallow in 1962 and 1963 and thus escaped notice. Stores operated by Hopis are listed and contrasted with the apparent failure of Navajos to open stores. At least four Navajo-operated stores have existed nearby, but knowledge of them would have required an exceptional familiarity with the Navajos on the author's part. Such omissions do not detract from the excellence of the work and do not alter any of the conclusions reached. I am far more critical of the price, which is very high for a paperback and will unduly limit its audience.

Ganado, Arizona DAVID M. BRUGGE